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"I declare that: The Non-transferable Cheque and the 
Liability of the Collecting and Drawee Banks is my own 
work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been 
indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references." 
Summary 
The paper is an attempt to deal with the non-transferable cheque. Three 
questions have been addressed: 
(a) Whether sections 58, 79 and 83 apply to non-transferable cheques; 
(b) whether the non-transferability of a cheque implies only that a 
cambial transfer is excluded, but transfer by means of a ordinary cession 
is still possible; 
(c) whether the collecting and drawee banks can be held liable for 
damages to the owner of a non-transferable cheque. 
(a) It is clear that section 58 does not apply to non-transferable cheques. 
After the decision in Eskom, it is also clear that section 79 does apply to 
such cheques. Regarding the applicability of section 83 to 
non-transferable cheques, there is uncertainty. 
(b) Whether the rights arising from a non-transferable cheque can be 
transferred by means of an ordinary cession, it is not yet clear. 
(c) That a collecting bank can be held delictually liable under the 
extended lex Aquilia was decided in Indac Electronics. By way of 
analogy, the same applies to a drawee bank acting negligently. 
Key terms: 
The non-transferable cheque. Applicability of sections 58, 79 and 83 to 
non-transferable cheques. Cambial transfer of non-transferable cheques. 
Cession of the rights arising from a non-transferable cheque. Liability of 
the collecting and drawee banks. Delictual liability of the collecting 
bank. Delictual liability of the drawee bank. 
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The Non-transferable Cheque and the 
Liability of the Collecting and Drawee Banks 
1 Introduction 
South African legislation provides for order and bearer 
cheques. It does not specifically provide for a non-transferable 
cheque, but it is possible in terms of s 6(5), 1 to prevent or 
restrict the negotiability of a bill, cheque or note.2 Only one 
person, namely the payee, can be the holder of a cheque that 
was drawn containing words prohibiting transfer or indicating 
' Bills of Exchange Act 34of1964 (hereafter the Act). Section 6(5) is made 
applicable to cheques by s 71. 
2 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Sham Magazine Centre 1977 (1) SA 484 
(A); Impala Plastics (Pty) v Coetzer 1984 (2) SA 392 (W) 395; Malan and 
Pretorius Malan on Bills of Exchange Cheques and Promissory Notes 
(1997) para 228 (hereafter Malan and Pretorius). See in general Pretorius 
A Transferable 'Non-Transferable', Cheque (1984) 101 SALJ 250; 
Malan and Pretorius The Perfect Cheque 1992 TSAR 77; Malan and 
Pretorius Eskom on Crossed Cheques Marked Not Transferable '(1996) 
8 SA Mere LJ 282; Kidd The Non-Transferable Cheque. Acceptable 
Ways to Mark Cheques (1992) 21 Businessman's Law 209; Cowen Two 
Cheers (or maybe only one) for Negotiability - The Sham Magazine 
case: Its Implications and Repercussions (1977) 40 THRHR 19; Malan 
The Liberation of the Cheque 1978 TSAR 107 114-115; Ailola 
Uncrossed Non-Transferable cheques : A Banker's Right to Refuse 
Payment or Collection. When Will the Law Change? (1995) 7 SA Mere 
LJ 249; Oelofse, Stassen and Du Plessis Hersiening van die Wisselwet 
(1983) 5 Modern Business Law 67; Malan, Oelofse and Pretorius 
Proposals for the Reform of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1964 (1998) 
555ff (Proposals); Banking Services: Law and Practice Report by the 
Review Committee Cm 622 February 1989 (Chairman RB Jack) 54ff and 
Appendix M ; Murray Crossed Checks, Account Payee and Non-
Negotiable Checks: Some Suggestions from Foreign Law (1968) 20 
Hastings Law Journal 273. 
2 
an intention that it should not be transferable3• In terms of the 
bank and customer relationship, the bank on which such a 
cheque is drawn may, in principle, debit the customer's 
account with the amount of the cheque only when payment 
has been made to the holder.4 
The non-transferable cheque is however, not without its own 
particular problems. Two questions are of special importance. 
The first is whether ss 58, 79 and 83 apply to non- transferable 
cheques. With reference to s 79, the question may be put as 
follows: can a drawee bank rely on due payment (which 
discharges its duty towards the drawer) if it pays the amount 
of a non-transferable cheque in good faith and without 
negligence to another bank, which is collecting the cheque for 
the wrong person? The second question is whether the non-
transferability of a cheque implies only that a cambial transfer 
(ie a transfer by means of indorsement plus delivery of the 
instrument) is excluded. In other words, can the rights arising 
from a non-transferable cheque still be transferred, subject to 
existing defects of title, by means of an ordinary cession?5 
Finally, does a bank paying a non-transferable cheque to or 
collecting it for someone other than the owner incur delictual 
liability to the owner for any loss he suffers because the 
cheque was paid, ie discharged? 
This paper is an attempt to deal with the non-transferable 
cheque and its problems. The liability of the collecting and 
drawee banks will also be dealt with. 
' Aboobaker v Gableite Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1978 (4) SA 615 (D). See 
Malan and Pretorius para 229. 
• Volkskas Bpk v Johnson 1979 (4) SA 775 (C) 778; Eskom v First 
National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 1995 (2) SA 386 (A) 397. 
5 See Oelofse Rektawissel en Rektatjek, Verhandeling en Sessie in die 
Duitse en Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1987) 9 Modern Business Law 129. 
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2 Expressions excluding negotiability 
In terms of s 29 of the Act a bearer cheque is negotiated by 
mere delivery and an order cheque by indorsement plus 
delivery.6 In principle, a cheque is transferable.7 Section 6(5) 
however, provides that if a bill contains words prohibiting 
transfer, or indicating an intention that it should not be 
transferable, it is valid as between the parties to the bill, but is 
not negotiable.8 A cheque can, therefore, be made not 
transferable by the addition of the applicable words - words 
indicating an intention to prohibit transfer. 
In R Barkhan Finance Corp. v Dabros (Pty) Ltd 9 the then 
Appellate Division accepted that a cheque would be 
non-transferable if made payable as follows: "Pay X only". 
An important qualification was added, namely, that the words 
prohibiting transfer must be legible (in this case the word 
"only"). The court said that such words should be sufficiently 
legible and clear to indicate the intention with certainty on 
perusal of the document with ordinary care. A cheque can also 
be made non-transferable by placing the words "not 
transferable" on it. 10 The words "account payee only" on a 
6 The verb negotiate is defined in s 29 . In particular s 29 (I) provides that 
a bill is negotiated if it is transferred from one person to another in such a 
manner as to constitute the transferee the holder of the bill. It follows that 
for a bill (including a cheque - a cheque is a bill drawn on a bank and 
payable on demand) to be negotiable in terms of s 29 (1), the payee must 
be able to transfer it in such a way that the transferee becomes the holder. 
7 See also s 6. 
• In Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Sham Magazine Centre 1977 (I) SA 484 
(A) Holmes JA remarked that '(s)ometimes the Act and the cases do not 
make immediately clear in what sense the word "negotiable" is used' (at 
493 H). The learned Judge of appeal held that the two concluding words 
of s 6 (5) 'must mean "not transferable'" (at 493). 
• 1968 (2) SA 686 (A) 691-692. 
w Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Sham Magazine Centre 1977 (1) SA 484 
(A)504-505; Aboobaker v Gableite Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1978 (4) SA 
Continued on next page ... 
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cheque do not exclude transferability.11 The question may 
arise as to what the effect of these words is, if any. In the 
Sham Magazine case Holmes JA stated the following 
concerning the words "account payee only": 
"They may operate as some safeguard if the cheque should 
fall into the wrong hands. They are, in effect, a direction 
to the collecting banker that the specified payee should 
receive the money. These words cease to have any 
operation if the payee specified in the cheque transfers it 
( eg by special indorsement) because there upon the 
specified payee parts with his right to receive the 
money". 12 
Before the decision in Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas 
Bank (Pty) Ltd, 13 the standpoint of South African courts was 
that a collecting bank was not liable to the true owner for the 
negligent (in contrast to intentional) collection of a cheque for 
an unlawful possessor. 14 In view of this, De Wet and Van 
Wyk15 expressed the opinion that the courts might recognise 
615 (D) 616; Bonitas Medical Aid Fund v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1991 (2) 
SA 231 (W) 235; Bonitas Medical Aid Fund v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 
(2) SA 42 (W) 44; Malan and De Beer Bills of Exchange Cheques and 
Promissory Notes in South African Law (1983) paras 116 and 347 
(hereafter Malan and De Beer); Gering Handbook of the Law of 
Negotiable Instruments (1993) 111-115 (hereafter Gering Handbook). 
11 See in this regard the Sham Magazine case (Standard Bank of SA Ltd v 
Sham Magazine Centre 49lfi) which overruled Dungarvin Trust (Pty) 
Ltd v Import Refrigeration Co (Pty) Ltd 1971 (4) SA 300 (W) 305 and 
Rhostar (Pvt) Ltd v Netherlands Bank of Rhodesia Ltd 1972 (2) SA 703 
(R) 705. In the meantime it has also been accepted in Zimbabwe that the 
words "account payee only" do not result in the non-transferability of a 
cheque, and that the decision in the Rhostar case is wrong. (Phi/sham 
(Pvt) Ltd v Beverley Building Society and another 1977 (2) SA 546 (R) 
550). 
12 504H. 
13 1992 (1) SA 783 (A). 
14 See the discussion below. 
15 Die SuidAfrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg (1978) 4ed 810 fn 
560. 
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liability for negligent collection if the words "account payee 
only" were placed on a crossed cheque. Since the Appellate 
Division in Indac Electronics has now recognised liability for 
negligent collection without the words "account payee only" 
appearing on the cheque, it is clear that the words are without 
meaning in our law. 16 In England, the Bills of Exchange Act 
was amended in 1992 by the insertion of a new provision.17 
According to this provision, the words "account payee" or 
"ale payee" (with or without the word "only") on a crossed 
cheque, result in the cheque being not transferable. 18 As it is 
already explained, these words do not make a cheque 
non-transferable in South African law. 
Where words and expressions prohibiting transfer or 
indicating an intention that the instrument should not be 
transferable are used in addition to words such as "order" or 
"bearer", questions of interpretation arise. 
In Aboobaker v Gableite Distributors (Pty) Ltd19, a cheque 
was made payable to "A Baker Bros and Sons". The words 
"or bearer" were deleted and replaced by the word "order". 
The cheque also bore the words "not transferable". It was held 
16 These words however, may indicate negligence on the part of the 
collecting bank when someone else and not the specified payee, receives 
payment. See again the dictum of Holmes JA in the Sham Magazine case 
quoted above. See also Bank of Credit and Commerce Zimbabwe Ltd v 
UDC Ltd 1991(4) SA 82 (ZSC) 88. The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe held 
that the words 'account payee only' had been a warning to the appellant 
to credit the proceeds of the cheque only to an account bearing the 
identical name to that of the payee named on the cheque; and that its 
failure to do so, more especially when special clearance had been 
requested, had been negligent. McNally JA was specific. He said: "In that 
connection it can not be overlooked that the cheque was crossed 'account 
payee only'. The decision in the Sham Magazine case supra did not 
deprive the words of any meaning. It simply said that the words do not 
affect transferability" (88E). 
11 S 81ABEA. 
1
• See in this regard Fox J and Smith H The Cheques Act 1992 (1992) 7 
Journal of International Banking Law 280. 
1
• 1978 (4) SA 615 (D) 616. 
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that the cheque was non-transferable. The impression of 
transferability created by the word "order" is subordinate to 
the clear indication of non-transferability flowing from the 
words "not transferable".20 
In Impala Plastics (Pty) Ltd v Coetzer 21 the cheques were 
also marked "not transferable'', but were made payable to a 
specified person or bearer. As in Aboobaker the court came 
to the conclusion that the cheques were non-transferable. It 
follows from this decision that no one but the original payee 
can be the holder of an instrument drawn in favour of a named 
payee but also containing words prohibiting negotiation. To 
be holder of such a cheque, parties subsequent to the payee 
must acquire by negotiation, that is, by indorsement of the 
payee and delivery, but the payee is, in terms of s 6(5) unable 
to indorse and thus negotiate the cheque. What the position 
would be if the order simply read "pay bearer'', and the 
cheque were marked "not transferable", is not yet clear.22 
20 See also Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Sham Magazine Centre 1977 (1) 
SA 484 (A) 504-505. 
21 1984 (2) SA 392 (W). 
22 Malan and Pretorius (para 229) suggest another possible interpretation of 
s 6(5). Section 6(5) provides that a bill containing words prohibiting 
transfer or indicating an intention that it should not be transferable is valid 
as between the parties to the Bill, but is not negotiable. The parties to a 
bearer bill are the drawer, the payee (if one is named), and any person in 
possession or the bearer. One becomes holder of a bearer instrument 
simply by taking possession. According to the authors, although the payee 
in Impala Plastics was incapable of negotiating the cheques, any person 
who acquired possession became holder, since the cheques were payable 
to bearer. But since the "delivery" of the cheques would not have been 
effective as a negotiation, there cannot be a holder in due course of such 
an instrument. On the other hand, since the person in possession of a 
bearer instrument is holder, he can give a valid discharge for the cheque 
and a payment in due course can be made to him. 
This interpretation, it is considered, ignores the first part of the definition, 
namely, a bill containing words prohibiting transfer or indicating an 
Continued on next page ... 
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The crossing of a cheque does not affect its negotiability.23 
The words "not negotiable" on a crossed cheque (as distinct 
from a bill of exchange24) imply that the cheque is still 
transferable,25 but that nobody can become a holder in due 
course of such cheque. This needs to be qualified. If the words 
"not negotiable" are added to the crossing, the cheque can still 
be negotiated within the meaning of s 29(1), so that the 
transferree is constituted the holder of the cheque. But the 
negotiability of such a cheque is determined by s 80, and the 
true owner's rights in the event of theft or loss are determined 
by s 81. Under s 80, a person who takes a crossed cheque 
which bears the words "not negotiable" cannot acquire a 
better title than that which the person from whom he took it 
had; and he bears the risk that the transferor may have had a 
defective title to the cheque. The cheque retains its 
transferability, but loses that part of negotiability normally 
enjoyed by negotiable instruments, that is, the ability of a 
intention that it should not be transferable. The cheques in Impala 
Plastics were marked "not transferable", and this is a clear indication that 
they should not be transferable. See also R Barkhan Finance 
Corporation v Dabros (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) SA 686 (A) 691; Gibson 
South African Mercantile and Company Law (1988) 6ed 549 fu 66e. 
23 See Malan and Pretorius paras 44 and 221. 
24 The same words "not negotiable" when written on a bill of exchange, not 
being a crossed cheque, render the bill non - transferable (Hibernian 
Bank v Gysin and Hansen All ER 166 (CA), affirming on appeal (1938) 
2 All ER 575, although not on identical reasoning. See also Trust Bank 
of Africa Ltd vStandardBank of South Africa Ltd 1968 (3) SA 166 (A) 
180 191 ). Only the payee can be the holder of such a bill. If the payee 
indorses a bill of exchange marked "not negotiable", the transferee does 
not become the holder within the meaning of s 29. Thus for a bill to be 
negotiable in terms of s 29, the payee must be able to transfer it in such a 
way that the transferee becomes the holder. 
25 Commissioners of the State Savings Bank of Victoria v Permewan 
Wright and Co Ltd (1914) 19 CLR 457 458: "The words 
'non-negotiable' though restricting the negotiability of the cheque in a 
certain sense, are not prohibitive of payment to a person other than the 
named payee or 'bearer'." See Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Sham 
Magazine Centre 1977 (1) SA 484 (A) 493; OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd v 
Universal Stores Ltd 1972 (3) 187 (C) 179; Aboobaker v Gableite 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1978 (4) SA 615 (D) 616. 
8 
transferee, who takes the instrument in good faith and for 
value, to acquire a title free from defences which could 
otherwise have been raised against his predecessor. If the 
payee of a crossed cheque bearing the words "not negotiable" 
indorses and delivers it to another person, the transferee 
becomes the holder of the instrument, but he can not have a 
better title than the payee had had. The transferee is said to 
take the cheque "subject to equities".26 To put it in another 
way. If a drawer adds the words "not negotiable" to the 
cheque, no subsequent holder can become a holder in due 
course. The addition of the words "not negotiable" does 
therefore affect the negotiability of the cheque in the sense 
that no transferree can become a holder in due course of such 
a cheque.27 Now, if a "not negotiable" crossed cheque is made 
payable to a particular person only, or contains the words "not 
transferable", the cheque is non-transferable.28 
3 Applicability of sections 58, 79 and 83 to 
Non-transferable Cheques 
The drawee banker, i e the banker on whom the drawer draws 
the cheque, in carrying out his duty to honour his customer's 
cheques must make payment in due course, being payment at 
or after maturity, to the holder in good faith, without 
knowledge of any defect in the holder's title.29 Holder means 
the payee or indorsee of a bill who is in possession of it, or the 
26 See Gering Crossed Cheques Inscribed 'A/c payee' or 'Not-
transferable' (1977) 94SALJ152 155. 
27 See Cowen and Gering Cowen on the Law of Negotiable Instruments in 
South Africa (1966) 4ed 435-436 (hereafter Cowen (1966) 4ed) where 
the application of s 80 is illustrated by means of an example. 
2
• Volkskas Bpk. v Johnson 1979 (4) SA 775 (C). In this case too, the 
impression of transferability created by the "not negotiable" crossing was 
overridden by the words clearly prohibiting transfer. With regard to 
markings see also Sharrock and Kidd Understanding Cheque Law (1993) 
81-86 (hereafter Sharrock and Kidd). 
29 s 1 'payment in due course'. 
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bearer thereof, 30 and bearer is the person in possession of a 
bill payable to bearer.31 Thus, ifthe cheque is payable to order 
he must pay the named payee or the last named indorsee or, if 
it is payable to bearer, he must pay the person who is in 
possession of the cheque. Only then is the drawee entitled to 
debit his customer's account with the amount of the cheque.32 
Where the banker makes payment in due course he may debit 
his customer's account, and in certain circumstances in failing 
to do so, may rely on ss 58, 79 or 83.33 
3.1 Section 58 
3.1.1 A cheque is payable to order if it is expressed to be so 
payable, or if it is expressed to be payable to a particular 
person and does not contain words prohibiting transfer or 
indicating an intention that it should not be transferable.34 
If the drawee banker pays a cheque drawn payable to order, 
which bears a forged indorsement, he would not be making 
payment in due course because he would not be making 
payment to a holder. The reason is that any party who 
acquires a cheque through a forged or unauthorised 
indorsement cannot be a holder because such an indorsement 
is wholly inoperative and no right to retain the instrument can 
30 s 1 'holder'. 
31 s 1 'bearer'. 
32 See National Bank v Paterson 1909 TS 322 327; Stapelberg NO v 
Barclays Bank DC and 0 1963 (3) SA 120 (T) 124; Eskom v First 
National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 1995 (2) SA 386 (A)391; Malan 
and Pretorius para 207; Gering Handbook 235. 
33 See Malan and De Beer paras 297 and 349. The authors submit that the 
provisions relating to payment in due course, as well as ss 58, 79 and 83 
are terms of the contractual relationship between drawee bank and 
customer. See however, Crosskopf JA's remarks in Eskom v First 
National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 1995 (2) SA 386 (A) in regard to 
s 79 (at 391A-E). These terms arise ex lege and not ex consensu, 
Grosskopf JA said. 
34 s 6 (3). 
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be acquired through it.35 However, s 58 allows for an 
important exception to this rule. The section is designed to 
protect the drawee banker and it is of great practical 
importance. Section 58 provides as follows: 
"If a bill payable to order on demand is drawn on a banker, 
and the banker pays the bill in good faith and in the 
ordinary course of business, it is not incumbent on the 
banker to show that the indorsement of the payee or any 
subsequent indorsement was made by or under the 
authority of the person whose indorsement it purports to 
be, and the banker is deemed to have paid the bill in due 
course, although such indorsement has been forged or 
made without authority : Provided such indorsement does 
not purport to be that of a person who is a customer of the 
banker at the branch on which the said bill is drawn." 
It follows that if an indorsement on a cheque is forged but the 
drawee bank pays the instrument in good faith and in the 
ordinary course of business, it would be entitled to debit the 
account of its customer. 36 
Section 58 relieves the drawee banker of the burden of 
proving the genuineness of indorsements or who authorised 
them in those cases where the banker must show that he has 
made payment to the holder of a bill payable to order on 
35 s 22. It states : "Subject to the provisions of this Act, if a signature on a 
bill is forged or placed thereon without the authority of the person whose 
signature it purports to be, the forged or unauthorised signature is wholly 
inoperative, and no right to retain the bill or to give a discharge therefor or 
to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto can be acquired 
through or under that signature, unless the party against whom it is sought 
to retain or enforce payment of the bill is precluded from setting up the 
forgery or want of authority : Provided that nothing in this section 
contained shall affect the ratification of unauthorized signature not 
amounting to forgery." 
36 Stapelberg N 0 v. Barclays Bank DC&O 1963 (3) SA 120 (T) 124ff. See 
also Fouche et al Legal Principles of Contracts and Negotiable 
Instruments (1995) 3ed 330-331. 
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demand. Thus, the section applies only when the person to 
whom payment has been made derived his title as holder of 
the instrument from the validity of these indorsements. To 
qualify for this protection, the indorsement in question must 
be an indorsement in the legal sense of the word. It must have 
been placed on the cheque animo indorsandi, that is, with the 
intention of incurring the liability of an indorsement and 
transferring the instrument.37 
3.1.2 It has been mentioned that the effect of the words "not 
transferable" is to render the cheque valid only between the 
parties to the cheque38 and will therefore not be payable to 
bearer or to order. If a banker pays any person other than the 
named payee, he would not be paying the cheque in due 
course - not to a holder - as envisaged by the Act,39 and the 
protection afforded by s 58 would not apply in this case since 
this section applies only to cheques which can be validly 
indorsed. Not transferable cheques are therefore excluded. 
Furthermore, a non-transferable cheque is, by definition, not 
payable "to order" as required bys 58 but to a specific person 
only. Section 58 therefore, does not protect the drawee of a 
non-transferable cheque since this section applies to bills 
payable to order on demand.40 
3.2 Section 79 
3.2.1 The crossing of a cheque qualifies the order of a drawer 
and requires the drawee bank to pay the cheque in a specific 
37 National Bank v Paterson 1909 TS 322 326-327; Stapelberg v Barclays 
Bank DC&O 1963 (3) SA 120 (T) 125; Eskom v First National Bank 
of Southern Africa Ltd 1995 (2) SA 386 (A) 391. See Malan and De Beer 
para324. 
38 s 6(5). 
39 see s 1 'payment in due course'. 
40 See Malan and Pretorius paras 230 and 209; Malan and Pretorius The 
Perfect Cheque? 1992 TSAR 77 79 and fn 18. 
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manner, namely, in accordance with the provisions of s 78.41 If 
a cheque is crossed generally, the drawee bank may pay only 
to a banker, to any banker.42 If a cheque is crossed specially, 
the drawee bank may pay only to the specific banker to whom 
it has been crossed, or to that banker's agent for collection, 
who must also be a banker.43 
By crossing a cheque, the duty of the drawee banker is 
modified in the sense that he is required to pay the cheque 
through the medium of a bank only. The assumption is that 
bankers are persons of great respectability who are incapable 
of lending themselves to any concealment or suppression of 
the truth.44 Malan and Pretorius,45 commenting on that, say 
that by involving a bank in the cheque collection process, it 
41 Eskom v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 1995 (2) SA 386 
(A) 391. See Malan and Pretorius para 219; Gering Handbook 270. 
42 s 78(1). 
43 s 78(2). If the drawee bank pays the crossed cheque in contravention of 
these prohibitions, it is liable to the true owner for any loss he may suffer 
because the cheque was so paid (s 78(4)). The liability in s 78(4) is not 
based on fault- it is strict liability ex lege (Malan and De Beer para 332). 
There are several grounds on which a drawee banker who acts in 
contravention of these prohibitions would not be entitled to debit his 
customer's account. Paget (Paget's Law of Banking (1989) 371) says that 
payment contrary to the crossing is, apart from statutory enactment, 
negligence on the part of the drawee banker, and if loss ensues the drawee 
banker cannot debit the account of its customer. But the more important 
reason is that payment in contravention of the crossing, in disobedience of 
the customer's mandate, is an unauthorised payment with which the 
banker cannot debit its customer's account. He then says : "In the face of 
the crossed cheques sections and the universal practice of bankers 
(emphasis added) no banker could for a moment contend that he did not 
understand what his customer meant by crossing the cheque, or that it 
meant anything but what it did during the period the direct prohibition 
remained on the statute book." 
The proviso to s 78(4) protects the drawee bank where it pays in good 
faith and without negligence in accordance with the appearance of the 
cheque at the time of presenting it (see Gering Handbook 271). 
44 Bellamy v Marjoribanks 1852 (7) Ex 389 403- 404; 155 ER 999 1006; 
Discounting and Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Franskraalstrand (Pty) Ltd 
1962 (2) SA 559 (W) 562. 
45 1992 TSAR 77 79. 
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would in theory improve the protection afforded to the true 
owner of a cheque, in the event of theft or loss. By crossing a 
cheque the drawer thus ensures that "payment is made through 
the filter of banker-customer relationship." To some extent, 
theoretically at least, the bank receiving payment would have 
taken some steps to verify the identity, address, etc. of the 
person depositing the cheque for payment. However, 
experience has shown that this safeguard of the drawer is 
somewhat illusionary since the banks do not always take all 
the necessary steps to verify the identity and other particulars 
of their depositors. Furthermore, the drawer's recourse against 
his own bank is limited - it is practically only when the bank 
pays contrary to the crossing, for example, when it pays in 
cash over the counter, the amount of the crossed cheque, that 
it incurs liability to the true owner of the cheque; only then 
will the drawee bank not be able to debit the drawer's 
account with the amount of the cheque.46 This happens very 
seldom, if at all. The drawee banker is given further protection 
by s 79. This section stipulates that when the drawee banker, 
in good faith and without negligence, pays in accordance with 
the crossing, that is, when he pays to a banker on a general 
crossing or the banker to whom it is crossed specially or his 
agent for collection, on a special crossing,47 the bank paying 
the cheque, and, if the cheque has come into the hands of the 
payee, the drawer, "shall respectively be entitled to the same 
rights, and placed in the same position as if payment of the 
cheque had been made to its true owner thereof." 
Thus, if the drawee banker does pay to a bank in accordance 
with the crossing, and pays in good faith and without 
negligence, it will, in terms of s 79, be deemed to have paid in 
due course although in actual fact it has not ( eg because 
payment has been made to a collecting bank of a thief who 
was not the holder). Since, under s 79, the drawee bank's 
payment is deemed to have been in due course, the cheque is 
46 s 78(4). 
47 s 78. 
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discharged (all rights of action thereon have been 
extinguished), and the drawee banker is entitled to debit the 
drawer's account with the amount of the cheque.48 
Furthermore, the drawer's liability on the cheque and on any 
underlying obligation is also discharged where the cheque 
came into the hands of the payee, even though the cheque has 
not been technically discharged because payment may not 
have been made to a bank collecting for the holder.49 
3.2.2 As far as the applicability of s 79 is concerned, in our 
view this section does not apply to non-transferable cheques, 
for the same reason that ss 58 and 83 do not apply to such 
cheques, namely, because these sections apply only to cheques 
which can be validly indorsed. 
It has been mentioned that the crossing of a cheque qualifies 
the order of a drawer and requires the drawee bank to pay the 
cheque in a specified manner, namely, in accordance with the 
provisions of s 78. Although the instruction to pay is altered 
by the crossing, the crossing has no effect on the negotiability 
of the cheque. Even if the words "not negotiable" are added to 
the crossing, the cheque can still be negotiated within the 
meaning of s 29(1), so that the transferee is constituted the 
holder of the cheque. Crossed cheques can therefore be 
validly indorsed. Now, where a cheque is drawn payable to a 
certain person and in addition contains words prohibiting 
transfer, it is not transferable and only the named payee can be 
48 Eskom v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 1995 (2) SA (A) 
391. See also Robarts v Tucker 1851 (16) QB 560 (117 ER 994); Malan 
and Pretorius para 179. 
49 Volkskas Bank Bpk v Bonitas Medical Aid Fund 1993 (3) SA 779(A) 
794. In Eskom v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 1995 (2) 
SA 386 (A), the then Appellate Division stated that a banker who is in 
terms of s 79, "entitled to the same rights and placed in the same position 
as if payment of the cheque had been made to the true owner thereof' may 
debit his customer's account with the amount of the cheque, even though 
payment may have been to somebody who was not the holder (at 
391B-C). 
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the holder of it.so To be a holder of such a cheque, parties 
subsequent to the payee must acquire by negotiation (by 
indorsement of the payee and delivery), but the payee is, in 
terms of s 6(5), unable to indorse and thus negotiate the 
cheque.s1 Since non-transferable cheques cannot validly be 
indorsed, s 79 does not apply to them. Furthermore, 
non-transferable cheques are not payable to the order of the 
payee - only to the named payee. sz 
In Johnson,s3 where a crossed, non-transferable cheque was 
involved, the court stateds4 that in terms of the bank and 
customer relationship, a bank on which a cheque is drawn, is 
obliged to execute its customer's order as it is expressed in the 
cheque. A bank may debit the account of its customer with the 
amount of the cheque paid only if it has complied with the 
instructions given to it. It is part of this relationship that the 
bank is precluded from paying anyone other than the person 
indicated by the customer.ss The court further held that a non-
transferable cheques6 affords no-one but the payee the right to 
claim payment. s7 The fact that the cheque was crossed 
imposed an obligation on the drawee not to pay anyone but a 
bank and this duty does not conflict with the duty to pay only 
the payee.ss The order given by the drawer to the drawee was 
to pay the amount ofthe cheque to the payee, and since it was 
crossed, to a bank collecting on behalf of the payees9• Because 
in casu, payment was made to neither the payee nor a bank 
collecting on behalf of the payee, the court held (correctly, it 
so Aboobaker v Gableite Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1978 (4) SA 615 (D) 616. 
si See Impala Plastics (Pty) Ltd v Coetzer 1974 (2) SA 392 (W) 397. 
sz See also s 6(1). It states : "A bill must be payable either to bearer or to 
order to be negotiable." 
s3 Volkskas Bpk v Johnson 1979 (4) SA 775 (C). 
S• 777-778. 
ss 778.See National Bank v Paterson 1909 TS 322 325-327. 
s• s 6(5). 
S7 778. 
ss s 78. See also Eskom v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 
1995 (2) SA 386 (A) at 397 H-J. 
S9 780. 
16 
is respectfully submitted) that the drawee bank had acted in 
breach of its mandate and was therefore not entitled to debit 
the account of the drawer.60 It rejected the plaintiffs claim.61 
However, in Gishen v Nedbank Ltd 62 the drawer of a 
non-transferable, crossed cheque alleged that the cheque was 
not paid to the named payee and that the drawee bank had thus 
acted in breach of its mandate to pay the cheque to the named 
payee only. The court accepted that the cheque was not 
transferable63 but said64 that s 79 contains no indication that it 
60 Malan and De Beer (para 349) maintain that the crossing of a 
non-transferable cheque does not contradict the order to the drawee bank. 
The crossing of a cheque does not, according to them, mean that payment 
must be made only to a bank (or in terms of s 78); it means that if the 
cheque is not paid in accordance with the crossing the drawee bank will 
be liable to the true owner for any loss he may suffer. But see above what 
Paget has to say in this regard (fn 43). In Eskom v First National Bank of 
Southern Africa Ltd 1995 (2) SA 386 (A) Grosskopf JA stated : 
"Moreover it is clear that the sections of the Act dealing with crossed 
cheques form a coherent whole" (at 396 A-B). And at 397 H-J that: "If a 
cheque is crossed generally, the drawee bank may not pay it to any person 
other than a banker .... Therefore if a cheque is crossed generally, and in 
addition bears the words 'not transferable' , the drawee bank is instructed: 
(a) to pay the cheque only to the named payee; (b) to pay the cheque to a 
banker. The drawee bank can comply with both these instructions by 
paying to a banker acting on behalf of the payee (Volkskas Bpk v 
Johnson 1979 (4) SA 775 (C) at 779G)." But it was added at 397J-398A: 
"For present purposes I need not consider whether a bank may also 
properly (or at any rate, with impunity) pay such a cheque to the true 
owner or his agent personally, as suggested by Malan ... in para 349." 
61 Malan and De Beer ( para 349) are of the view that s 79 applies to 
non-transferable cheques and the real issue in Johnson was whether 
payment was made in terms of s 79, that is, "in good faith and without 
negligence". They add that the presence of the indorsements on the back 
of the cheque could indicate negligence on the part of the drawee bank. 
62 1984 (2) SA 378 (W) followed in Bonitas Medical Aid Fund v Volkskas 
Bank Ltd 1992 (2) SA 42 (W) which finding was not disputed on appeal 
in Volkskas Bank Bpk. v Bonitas Medical Aid Fund 1993 (3) SA 779 
(A). Gishen, like Johnson, deals with the banker-customer relationship in 
respect of crossed cheques marked "not-transferable" (Sinclair and Visser 
1984Annual Survey 389 ). 
63 380. 
64 382. 
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applies only to transferable cheques. It distinguished the 
Johnson65 case on the ground that that case had been dealing 
with a stated case which had left no room for the question as 
to the applicability of s 79.66 It held that s 79 applies to 
non-transferable cheques and since the bank had acted without 
negligence, was entitled to debit the account of the drawer. It 
rejected the drawer's claim. 
According to Pretorius, 67 the result of that judgement was that 
"we could say that there was a valid transfer of a non-
transferable cheque." The learned author explains that the 
purpose of s 79 is to shift the loss in the event of a forged 
indorsement on a crossed cheque from the drawee bank to the 
true owner thereof. In the case of a cheque made 
non-transferable by the drawer there is no possibility of a 
forged "indorsement", and the same reason to protect the 
drawee bank in terms of s 79 does not exist. Non-transferable 
cheques are not capable of being indorsed. Section 79 was 
never intended to deal with non-transferable cheques.68 
That s 79 applies to non-transferable cheques was confirmed 
by the then Appellate Division in Eskom v First National 
Bank of Southern Africa Ltd. 69 The court reasoned that banks 
65 Volkskas Bpk v Johnson 1919 (4) SA 775(C). 
66 See also Malan and De Beer (para 349) and Sinclair and Visser (1984 
Annual Survey 390) who make the same point. 
67 1984 SALJ250 256. 
68 For a full discussion of the Gishen case see Pretorius A Transferable 
'Non- transferable' Cheque 1984 SALJ 250. In a less than enthusiastic 
case note on this decision Sinclair and Visser (1984 Annual Survey 389 
ft) remark that the plaintiff would have been better off had the cheque not 
been crossed for bankers' protection in such cases apply where payment is 
made 'in the ordinary course of business.' The authors conclude : "It 
would be rather absurd for a drawee bank to get away with saying that in 
the ordinary course of business, even when apprised of the facts, it ignores 
part of the mandate of the drawer (its customer)." They call for legislative 
intervention ''to bring this part of our law into line with contemporary 
banking practice." 
69 1995 (2) SA 386 (A) 400. 
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need protection against paying a person falsely pretending to 
be the payee of a non- transferable cheque and that the remedy 
is in the drawer's own hands - he need not cross the cheque if 
he wants to exclude the protection of s 79. It however appears 
that this point was decided on convenience rather than 
principles of law.70 
3.2.3 With regard to the question whether the presence of an 
"indorsement" on the reverse side of a non-transferable 
cheque is an indication of negligence on the part of the drawee 
bank, there is uncertainty. In Gishen, 71 the opinion was 
expressed that the presence of a single "indorsement" on the 
back of a non-transferable cheque does not indicate 
negligence on the part of the drawee bank, whereas in 
Johnson, 72 it was accepted that the presence of more than one 
"indorsement" on the back of such a cheque does indicate 
negligence. In Bonitas,73 this question did not arise because 
there was no such "indorsement" on the back of the cheque. 
The Eskom74 case was decided on exception, and the question 
whether the bank had been negligent, was accordingly not an 
issue for decision before the court.75 It is suggested that it 
should make no difference whether there is only an 
"indorsement" professing to be that of the payee, or whether 
there are more indorsements on the cheque. In both cases it is 
an indication that the collecting bank is collecting for 
someone other than the payee. In both cases the drawee bank 
70 See the discussion above. 
11 Gishen v Nedbank Ltd 1984 (2) 378{W) 381H - 382A. 
72 Volkskas Bank Bpk v Johnson 1972 (4) SA 775 (C) 777H. 
73 Bonitas Medical Aid Fund v Volkskas Bank Ltd and another 1992 (2) 
SA42 (W). 
74 Eskom v First National Bank of Southern Africa 1995 (2) SA 386 {A). 
75 The Eskom case is discussed by Malan and Pretorius in 1996 SA Mere LJ 
282. 
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will be negligent and will therefore lose the protection of s 79 
ifthe cheque is paid without further enquiry.76 
3.2.4 On the question whether s 79 applies where the drawee 
bank and collecting bank is the same bank, that is, where two 
branches of the same bank are involved, two cases are relevant 
The first is the judgement of Stegman J in Allied Bank Ltd v 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd.71 The other is the judgement of 
Goldblatt J in Hollandia Reinsurance Co. Ltd v Nedcor Bank 
Ltd.18 Both judgements deal with a claim for the re-crediting 
of a cheque account after a crossed, non-transferable cheque 
had been paid by the crediting of the account of someone 
other than the payee. In both cases the cheque concerned had 
been drawn on the defendant bank, by a drawer which had its 
account at a certain branch of the defendant bank, and was 
deposited in an account kept at another branch of the same 
bank. In both cases the bank relied on s 79. 
In Allied Bank Ltd Stegmann J interpreted s 79 to mean that 
the provision applies only if payment has in fact been made by 
one bank to another bank. That is, of course, not the case 
where the drawee bank and the collecting bank is the same 
bank, which was the position in the two cases. Where two 
branches of the same bank are involved, payment takes place 
76 See also Sharrock and Kidd 165 fn 25. The authors say that failure to 
observe inoperative indorsements on the cheque may amount to 
negligence on the part of the bank. Hugo (1992 Stellenbosch LR 115 128) 
says that the bank will be negligent if it collects a non-transferable cheque 
on behalf of a customer who purports to be holding it in terms of an 
indorsement. Malan and Pretorius (1993 SA Mere LJ 206 215) say that 
non-transferable cheques cannot be 'indorsed' and a bank would be prima 
facie negligent if it collects payment of such a cheque on behalf of a 
customer who purports to be holding in terms of an 'indorsement'. 
77 case no. 17379/91, WLD, unreported. 
78 1993 (3) SA 574 (W). 
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by mere debiting and crediting of the two accounts. There is 
no payment by one bank to another bank. Consequently, 
Stegmann J held, that s 79 did not apply.79 In Hollandia 
Reinsurance Co Ltd,80 Goldblatt J was of the view that the 
debiting and crediting of the accounts does amount to payment 
by a bank to a bank, although it is a payment by one bank to 
itself. He held that s 79 does apply where two branches of the 
same bank are involved. Support for the latter view can also 
be found in English case law.81 Goldblatt J regards it as 
unlikely that the legislature wished to limit the protection of 
s 79 to the case where two completely different banks are 
involved. The latter view was confirmed by the Appellate 
division in Eskom v First National Bank of Southern Africa 
Ltd, 82 that is , that s 79 applies where two branches of the 
same bank are involved. 
It would appear that the interpretation in the Hollandia case is 
correct. Section 79 speaks of a payment "to a banker."83 There 
is no reason why the drawee bank should not be protected by 
79 The Allied Bank Ltd case is discussed by Malan and Pretorius in 1993 
TSAR 454. See further Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Oneanate 
Investments Ltd 1995 (4) SA 510 (C) 529 ; Cambanis Buildings (Pty) 
Ltd v Gal 1983 (2) SA 128 (N). Also, Volkskas Bank Bpk v Bankorp 
Bpk 1991 (3) SA 605 (A) and the comments of Prof Pretorius in 1991 
Annual Survey 271-272. 
80 1993 (3) SA 574 (W) 556-557. 
81 See Gordon v London City and Midland Bank (1902) l KB 243 275. 
82 1995 (2) SA 386 (A) 397D-E. At 397 A-E the court stated : "The language 
of ss 78 and 79 suggests that the sections require payment of a crossed 
cheque to be made by one bank to another. On the other hand, it would 
not place an intolerable strain on the language to permit one bank to be 
both the collecting banker and paying banker and the exigencies of 
commerce would be best served by such a construction." Fourie 
(Protection of the Drawee Bank 1995 De Rebus 495) points out the 
practical difficulties which would arise if two branches of the same bank 
are involved and the bank is not protected, as was held by Stegmann J. He 
adds that the decision in Eskom on this point "has been well received by 
the banks". 
83 Compare the wording of s 83(1) : 'pays to another banker.' See 
Carpenter's Co v British Mutual Banking Co 1937 (3) All ER 811 822. 
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s 79 against a forged indorsement merely because the cheque 
has been deposited with another branch of the same bank. 84 
Support for Goldblatt J's view can also be found in s 78. 
According to s 78, a crossed cheque may only be paid to a 
bank. If Stegmann J's interpretation is correct, it is not 
possible to comply with s 78, in the case where the cheque is 
deposited in another account with the same bank. 85 
Although s 79 was therefore applicable in principle in both 
the above-mentioned cases we are of the view that in both 
cases the bank could not rely on s 79, because the payment did 
not take place without negligence. In this regard it should be 
kept in mind that the cheque in both cases was 
non-transferable. Furthermore, the same bank was involved as 
drawee and collector. Clearly the bank was negligent in 
accepting the cheque for credit of the account of someone 
other than the payee. Since payment of the cheque took place 
by a mere debiting and crediting of the accounts, the conduct 
of the branch where the cheque was deposited was also part of 
the payment process, and negligence in this regard should be 
taken into account in the application of s 79.86 Accordingly it 
appears that, in the case of a non-transferable cheque, s 79 
84 See Pretorius 1993 Annual Survey 482. Professor Pretorius is also of the 
view that there is no compelling reason why s 79 should be so 
restrictively interpreted and apply only if payment has in fact been made 
by one bank to another bank. 
85 See the remarks of Goldblatt J in Hollandia Reinsurance Co Ltd v 
Nedcor Bank Ltd 1993 (3) 574 (W) at 557-558, and those of Grosskopf 
JA in Eskom v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 1995 (2) SA 
386 (A) at 397B-C. See also Gering Handbook 271. 
86 See the remarks of the then Appellate Division in Volkskas Bank Bpk v 
Bankorp Bpk (h/a Trust Bank) en 'n ander 1991 (3) SA 605 (A) at 
61 lE-F in this regard. It was stated there : when the bank acts as drawee 
and also operates as a collector, the bank is obliged, as an authorised 
collector, to be aware of its act as authorised drawee in so far as it acts for 
the creditor or debtor of the different accounts which must be on equal 
footing of payment. In both capacities the bank must have knowledge of 
the payments (our translation). Also, the remarks of Grosskopf JA in 
Eskom v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 1995 (2) SA 386 
(A) at 399B-C. 
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will protect the drawee bank only if the amount of the cheque 
is collected by another bank.87 
If the bank in the Allied Bank Lt~8 and the Hollandia 
Reinsurance Co Ltll9 case could in fact have relied on s 79 
(which in our view is not the case), it would of course have 
been entitled to debit the drawer's account. However, that 
does not mean that the bank would then have incurred no 
liability. The bank would have been delictually liable to the 
true owner as a result of negligent collection.90 
As mentioned the difference of opinion between The Allied 
Bank Ltd case and the Hollandia Reinsurance Co Ltd case 
was finally decided in Eskom v First National Bank of 
Southern Africa Ltd,91 that is, that s 79 applies where two 
branches of the same bank are involved. 92 
87 See Oelofse Onlangse Ontwikkelings in die Tjekreg (1991) 3 SA Mere 
LJ 364 397 ff. 
88Allied Bank Ltd v Standard Bank of SA Ltd case no 173 79/91, 
WLD(unreported). 
89 Hollandia Reinsurance Co Ltd v Nedcor Bank Ltd 1993 (3) SA 574 (W). 
90 In connection with the Allied Bank Ltd and Hollandia Reinsurance Co 
Ltd cases Malan and Pretorius (Holders Collecting Banks and Payment 
1993 TSAR 454 462), are of the opinion that a bank's intention or 
negligence in its capacity as collector cannot be ascribed to it in its 
capacity as drawee. For the reasons mentioned above we cannot agree 
with that. Such a result would only be possible if the Bills of Exchange 
Act is amended to the effect that two branches of the same bank should be 
regarded as different banks for the purpose of , inter alia, s 79. See 
Oelofse 1991 SA Mere LJ 364 379 for such an arrangement in New 
Zealand law. 
91 1995 (2) SA 386 (A). 
92 In Eskom v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 1995 (2) SA 
386 (A), firstly, the Appellate Division confirms the finding in the Gishen 
case (Gishen v Nedbank Ltd 1984 (2) SA 378 (W)) thats 79 does apply 
to non-transferable crossed cheques ( 400F). Secondly, the court confirms 
the finding in the Hollandia case (Hollandia Reinsurance Co Ltd v 
Nedcor Bank Ltd 1993 (3) SA 574 (W)) that s 79 applies when the 
Continued on next page ... 
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Although it is now clear that s 79 does apply in principle to a 
non-transferable cheque drawn on a specific bank and 
deposited in an account at the same bank, this does not mean 
that the bank will succeed in relying on s 79. Except in 
extraordinary circumstances, the bank will be negligent if the 
account of someone other than the payee is credited. As 
already mentioned, the Eskom case was decided on exception, 
and the question whether the bank had been negligent, was 
accordingly not an issue for decision before the court. 
Although the bank can rely on s 79, it still has to prove the 
absence of negligence. In the large majority of cases it will not 
be able to do so if a non-transferable cheque deposited at one 
of the bank's own branches is involved.93 
3.3 Section 83 
3.3.1 This section protects a bank paying cheques and certain 
other instruments that have not been indorsed or have been 
irregularly indorsed. Section 83(1) provides that if a bank in 
good faith and in the ordinary course of business credits the 
account of a customer with or pays to another bank the 
amount of any cheque drawn on it, it shall not incur liability 
by reason only of the absence of, or irregularity in, its 
indorsement, and the cheque shall be discharged by such 
crediting of the account in question by such payment. In terms 
drawee bank and the collecting bank is the same bank (397D). Thirdly, the 
court held that a drawee bank that wishes to rely on s 79 carries the onus 
to prove that it has paid in good faith and without negligence in 
accordance with the crossing (394D-E). 
93 In Eskom v First National Bank of Southern Africa 1995 (2) SA 386 
(A) the Appellate Division emphasised that the bank will not be protected 
by s 79 if it acted negligently. Grosskopf JA said : " it must be 
emphasised that the banker is not protected if he acts negligently. And in 
determining whether the paying bank was negligent one cannot leave out 
of account, I consider, that the paying bank was dealing with a 
non-transferable cheque" ( 400B-C). See Further KwaMashu Bakery Ltd v 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1995 (1) SA 377(D) 393; Malan and 
Pretorius Eskom on Crossed Cheques marked 'Not Transferable' 
(1996) 8 SA Mere LJ 282 286 287. 
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of s 83(1)(b)and (c) it is not only the payment of a cheque, but 
includes any other document issued by a customer of the 
banker, which is intended to enable any person to obtain 
payment on demand (or from any banker, ifthe document was 
issued on behalf of the state), or a draft, payable on demand 
and drawn by the banker on himself or his agent who is a 
banker, whether payable at the head office or at some other 
office of his bank or agent. In terms of s 83(2) the provisions 
of s 83(1) apply mutatis mutandis to any document which -
(a) was issued on behalf of the state; 
(b) is drawn upon or addressed to a servant of the state 
(referred to as the drawee), and 
( c) is intended to enable any person to obtain payment on 
demand from the drawee upon or from or through a 
banker, as if the document were a cheque and as if the 
drawee were a banker, and the state his customer. 
It is provided in s 86 that the documents referred to in ss 83 -
85 are not to be regarded as negotiable instruments unless they 
would otherwise be negotiable. 
Furthermore, when payment is made in accordance with s 83 
the cheque will be discharged, ie the drawee banker will be 
entitled to debit the drawer's account with the amount of the 
cheque.94 Only if the drawee bank makes payment in good 
faith and in the ordinary course of business and it either 
credits the account of its customer with, or pays to another 
bank, the amount of the cheque drawn on it, the bank will be 
protected by the section95• There is no additional requirement 
that the bank must act without negligence. 
94 A cheque is discharged by payment in due course ( s 1 'payment in due 
course') or in tenns of ss 58, 79 or 83. 
95 s 83. 
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Section 83 is yet another provlSlon that governs the 
relationship between banker and customer.96 It is clear from 
the opening words of s 83(1) that the existence of an account 
is required in order that the drawee banker should be entitled 
to protection where payment is not made to another banker: 
"credits the account of a customer of his or pays to another 
banker."97The protection afforded to the drawee bank bys 58 
is extended by virtue of s 83. In ter_ms of s 58 there must be an 
indorsement before the banker can avail himself of the 
section, whereas in terms of s 83 the bank may be protected if 
the indorsement is irregular or in the absence of an 
indorsement.98 On the other hand, if the indorsement on the 
cheque is a forged indorsement, s 83 may not apply. In such a 
case the drawee bank may be able to rely on s 58, provided 
that the forgery is not a forgery of a customer of that branch of 
96 The Act does not define customer but the term is used in several sections 
(ss 58 (proviso), 73,81(5), 82 and 83). To be a customer a person must 
have a current or other account with a bank (Importers Co Ltd v 
Westminster Bank Ltd 1927 (2) KB 297 305). In Commissioners of 
Taxation v English and Australian Bank 1920 AC 683, Lord Dunedin 
said : "Their lordships are of the opinion that the word "customer" 
signifies a relationship in which duration is not of the essence. A person 
whose money has been accepted by a bank on the footing that they 
undertake to honour cheques up to the amount standing to his credit is ... a 
customer in the sense of the statute, irrespective of whether his connection 
is of short or long standing. The contract is not between an habitue and a 
newcomer, but between a person for whom the bank performs a casual 
service such as for instance, cashing a cheque introduced by one of their 
customers, and a person who has an account of his own at the bank" (at 
687). 
97 See Gering Handbook 286-287. Also, Sharrock and Kidd 166 where they 
say that the protection of s 83(1) applies where the party who presents the 
instrument for payment is also a customer at the bank, or is itself a bank. 
98 The word "indorsement" in s 83 is strictly speaking incorrect. In the past 
the intention was, after all, not as a rule that payees should make 
collecting banks holders by virtue of their "indorsements". In actual fact 
those signatures which banks demanded from depositors in the past were 
usually not true indorsements in the true sense of the word. See National 
Bank v Paterson 1909 TS 322 326-327. See also Gering Handbook 290; 
Cowen (1966) 4ed 442-444. 
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the bank, 99 and the other requirements of s 58 are met. If the 
cheque is crossed and it pays over the counter, s 78 will not 
apply, neither of course, ss 58 or 79. 100 
Section 79 protects a banker who pays a cheque in accordance 
with the crossing, 101 in good faith and without negligence. A 
forged indorsement will not disqualify the bank from the 
protection afforded bys 79. If there were no indorsement or 
an irregular indorsement, s 83 extends the protection of the 
bank. Where s 79 does not apply ( eg because the bank was 
negligent), the banker may be protected bys 83 if there is no 
indorsement or an irregular indorsement, but probably not 
where there is a forged indorsement - irregularities in 
indorsement can put a bank on inquiry which could exclude its 
good faith102, or render its payment out of the ordinary course 
of business103 • It is clear that a banker who pays cash over the 
counter on an unindorsed or irregularly indorsed cheque will 
not be protected by s 83. The banker must either credit the 
99 proviso to s 58. 
100 See Sharrock and Kidd 166. 
IOI S 78, 
102 s 94 : "A thing is deemed to be done in good faith within the meaning in 
this Act, if it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or 
not." Thus, the bank will not be in good faith when it knows that the 
person to whom payment is made is not entitled to it, or where it 
suspects that fact, but deliberately.refrains from making inquiries . The 
fact that the bank may have been negligent does not render its payment 
one in bad faith. See Malan and Pretorius para 119. 
103 A cheque is paid outside the ordinary course of business where it is paid 
after close of business (payment within a reasonable time after closing 
does not neccessarily mean a departure from the ordinary course of 
business - Baines v National Provincial Bank Ltd (1927) Com Cas 216 
218), where it is presented by post and payment is made by sending bank 
notes through the post, or where a large amount is paid over the counter in 
suspicious circumstances (The Governor and Company of the Bank of 
England v Bagliano Brothers 1891 AC 107 (HL) 117-118; Auchteroni 
and Co v Midrand Bank Ltd 1928 (2) KB 294 314-315). Payment in 
these circumstances will not be in good faith. See Malan and Pretorius 
para209. 
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customer's account with the amount of the cheque or pay to 
another bank.104 
It is not clear whether the operation of s 83 would include a 
forged indorsement. Malan and Pretorius105 are of the opinion 
that ss 83 and 84 are intended to afford bankers protection in 
the event of an absent or irregular indorsement and that the 
two sections should be given the same interpretation. 
According to them a forged or unauthorised indorsement is 
not an 'irregular indorsement' for the purposes of these 
sections. 
Section 83(1) uses the wording: 'absence of, or irregularity in 
indorsement,' while ins 84 the wording is: 'is not indorsed or, 
was irregularly indorsed'; and s 85 refers to 'an unindorsed 
or irregularly indorsed cheque'. Gering submits that all three 
forms of wording have the same meaning. 106 
In Arab Bank Ltd v Ross101 the indorsement was made by 
"Fathi and Faysal Nabulsy" although the note was payable to 
"Fathi and Faysal Nabulsy Company". The court held the 
indorsement to be valid but irregular, excluding a purchaser 
from being a holder in due course. Malan and Pretorius108 say 
that s 83 excludes reliance on irregularities such as this. 
'
04This requirement ensures that payment in effect, will be made only to 
customers of banks. Section 83 does not require the customer to be the 
payee of the cheque. However, South African Banks require the 
indorsement of the payee or a subsequent indorsee except where the 
cheque has been specially indorsed to the customer for whose account it is 
collected. See the banks' resolution dated 25-5-1964 cited by Cowen 
(1966 4ed) 448-449. According to Cowen (449) a 'new course of 
business' has been created in our banks. Conduct contrary to this 
resolution is unlikely to be "in the ordinary course of business." See 
Malan and De Beer para 343. 
'°5 para 224. 
'
06Gering Handbook 287. 
'°
7 1952 All ER 709 (CA). 
10
" para 224 fn 122. 
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There can be no doubt that a forged indorsement does not fall 
within the ambit of s 84. In terms of s 84 the collecting bank is 
protected only if a holder delivers the cheque for collection. If 
an order cheque bears a forged indorsement there can be no 
subsequent holder. 109 Tager110 suggests that s 83 should be 
restrictively construed and limited to the precise situation 
envisaged by the legislature. She explains that in terms of s 83 
the banker in certain circumstances will not "incur any 
liability by reason only of the absence of, or irregularity in" an 
indorsement. Accordingly, the section is intended to apply 
either when an indorsement is absent where one is necessary, 
or where an indorsement is irregular, ie where the name of the 
indorsing company is not correctly stated. Othersrn proceed 
on the assumption that s 83 covers forged indorsements. It 
follows that the matter awaits clarification by the courts. It 
does however appear that a forged indorsement cannot be 
regarded as regular. 
3.3.2 The question whether s 83 also applies to 
non-transferable cheques was left open in Gishen. 112 Malan 
and Pretorius113 say that the history of s 83 makes the 
application of that section to non-transferable cheques 
unlikely, since non-transferable cheques are incapable of 
being "indorsed". But they also say that the words of the 
section are "wide enough" to be applied to non-transferable 
cheques. 114 Pretorius115 considers it unlikely that it was 
intended that s 83 would apply to non-transferable cheques 
109 s 22. 
110 19 LAWSA para 166. 
111 Van Jaarsveld et al Suid-Afrikaanse Handelsreg (1988) 3ed 607. 
112 Gishen v Nedbank Ltd 1984 (2) SA 378 (W) 382-383. 
113 para233. 
114 See also Malan and De Beer para 349 fn 24; Malan and Pretorius 1992 
TSAR 77 90. If this interpretation is accepted and applying both ss 83 
and 79 to non-transferable cheques could lead to a cheque being 
discharged by virtue of the provisions of s 83 (s 83 merely requires a 
payment "in good faith and in the ordinary course of business") although 
the payment was not made without negligence as required bys 79. 
115 1984SALJ250 253. 
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because such cheques are not capable of being indorsed. The 
learned author also says that the protection afforded to banks 
in terms of ss 58 and 84 which are applicable to order 
instruments, are not applicable to non-transferable cheques, 
since such cheques are not payable to the order of the payee -
only to the named payee. According to Tager116 
non-transferable cheques do not fall within the ambit of s 83 
since no indorsement at all is intended on such cheques. 
In our view, s 83 (like s 58) clearly applies only to cheques 
which can be validly indorsed - there can be no indorsement 
on non-transferable instruments, and therefore, there can be 
no question of an "absence of or, irregularity in indorsement" 
as section s 83(1) requires in respect of such cheques. 
Non-transferable cheques are therefore excluded. 
Furthermore, the purpose of the sections, 117 as appears from 
the parliamentary Report of the Select Committee, 118 was "to 
abolish the necessity for the indorsement of cheques when 
they are deposited in the banking account of the payees 
concerned." The underlying motive for this amendment was to 
save the commercial banks and other large bodies who had to 
"indorse" many cheques, time and labour. 119 It is submitted 
thats 83 has nothing to do with non-transferable cheques. 
4 Crossing of Non-transferable Cheques 
In Gishen120 it was said that the customer (drawer) using the 
device of crossing a cheque, can hardly complain if the 
provisions of the Act in relation to such crossing are applied 
116 19 LAWSA para 166. 
117 SS 83, 84, 85 and 86. 
11
• Report of the Select Committee on the subject of the Bills of Exchange 
Amendment Bill, SC 10 1963. See Malan and De Beer para 341 fu 100. 
119 For the position in England see the Mocaua Report (para 14) and S 32(4) 
BEA. See also Sinclair and Visser 1984Annual Survey 391. 
120 Gishen v Nedbank Ltd 1984 (2) SA 378 (W). 
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according to their tenor. 121 The same things were repeated by 
Grosskopf JA in Eskom. 122 He said:"The main anomaly lies in 
the difference in the rights of the drawer depending on 
whether the non-transferable cheque is crossed or not. 
However, the remedy is in his own hands - he need not cross 
the cheque if he wants to exclude the protection of s 79."123 
The effect of these findings is that an uncrossed, non-
transferable cheque is a safer payment mechanism than a 
crossed, non-transferable cheque. 124 If the cheque is crossed, 
the drawee bank enjoys the protection of s 79 where the 
cheque is collected for the account of the wrong person. If the 
cheque is not crossed, s 79 (which applies to crossed cheques 
only) is not applicable. Nor do ss 58 and 83 apply, because 
they apply only to transferable cheques. 
However, banks have decided, with effect from 19 August 
1991, not to accept uncrossed, non- transferable cheques for 
collection. 125 The reasons for this are that the drawee bank 
cannot check whether the collecting bank is collecting the 
cheque for the account of the correct person, and that the 
drawee bank is also not protected by ss 58, 79 or 83. 
Accordingly, the banks' resolution is aimed at eliminating this 
risk run by the drawee bank. The application of the resolution 
eliminates the large-scale use of uncrossed non-transferable 
cheques, since most cheques are deposited in accounts. In 
terms of the resolution, payment of such a cheque can be 
obtained only by presenting it over the counter at the branch 
on which it is drawn. 
121 383. 
122 Eskom v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 1995 (2) 386 (A). 
123 400 E. 
124 Eskom v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 1995 (2) SA 386 
(A) 399C. See Malan and Pretorius 1992 TSAR 77 92; Pretorius (1984) 
101SALJ250255; Cowen (1977) 40 THRHR 19 41. 
125 See the notice published in, inter alia, the Citizen of 5 August 1991. 
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The above findings and the banks' resolution proceed from 
the assumption that, from the drawer's point of view, a 
non-transferable cheque which has not been crossed by him, is 
a safer instrument of payment than one which has in fact been 
crossed by him. The question therefore arises as to who is 
entitled to cross a non-transferable cheque. Of particular 
importance is the power of the collecting bank to cross a 
non-transferable cheque. 
When a cheque is handed to a bank for collection, the bank 
puts its stamp on the cheque. Since the collecting bank's 
stamp complies with the formal requirements for a special 
crossing, 126 and since s 76(6) gives the collecting bank the 
authority to cross the cheque specially to itself, 127 it can be 
argued that the stamp constitutes a valid special crossing. 128 If 
this is so, the drawee bank would still enjoy the protection of 
s 79, since the cheque would be crossed when it reached the 
drawee bank. It would also mean that the banks' resolution not 
to accept uncrossed non-transferable cheques for collection 
would be unnecessary, because the drawee bank would still 
enjoy the same protection that it would have enjoyed had the 
cheque already been crossed when it was handed to the 
collecting bank. 
Malan and Pretorius129 acknowledge that the stamp of the 
collecting bank formally constitutes a special crossing. They 
however, deny that in terms of s 76(6), the collecting bank has 
a general power to cross a cheque specially . They argue that 
s 76(6) provides for a cheque which is 'sent' to a banker for 
collection. Therefore, they are of the opinion that, if someone 
deposits a non-transferable cheque in his account, the 
126 s 75(2). 
121 See Cowen and Gering The Law of Negotiable Instruments in South 
Africa I (1985) 5ed 212. 
12
• See Fourie Protection of the Drawee Banker 1995 De Rebus 495. In 
his view the bank stamp which is placed on a cheque by the collecting 
bank when it is deposited is a crossing in terms of ss 75 (2) and 76 (6). 
129 para 231; 1992 TSAR 77 88-90. 
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collecting bank is not entitled to cross the cheque and that the 
stamp does not constitute a special crossing. It seems to be an 
anomaly that the stamp has legal consequences if the account 
holder sends the cheque to the bank, but not if he personally 
deposits the cheque. Malan and De Beer130 apparently do not 
make a distinction between 'sent' and 'deliver'. They say that 
the word 'sent' in s 76(6) was probably used to draw a 
distinction in cases where a cheque is delivered to the bank by 
the holder and can be returned immediately with a request to 
cross it, and where it is posted to the bank and cannot be 
returned to the holder immediately for crossing. They do not 
however, see any reason for this distinction to be maintained 
today. Cowen131 also interprets the word 'sent' widely to 
include deliver. Whatever the truth of the matter is, this is a 
subject that will have to be finally decided by the courts. 
However, it seems unlikely that the legislature intended to 
give such general power of crossing to the collecting banks. 
The fact that the banks felt threatened and passed the 
above-mentioned resolution, may bear testimony to this. 
5 The meaning of the concept 'Non-transferability' in the 
law of the bills of exchange 
The cambial transfer of the rights to and flowing from a 
cheque, takes place by indorsement plus delivery in the case 
of order cheques, 132 by mere delivery in the case of bearer 
cheques. 133 The personal rights flowing from a cheque can 
however, also be transferred by ordinary cession. 134 The 
question now is whether the words 'not transferable' or 'pay 
X only' mean that only the cambial transfer is no longer 
possible, but that cession is still possible. To put it in another 
130 para 331 fu 9. 
131 (1966) 4ed 423. 
132 s 29(3). 
133 s 29(2). 
134 Factory Investments (Pty) Ltdv Ismails 1960 (2) SA 10 (T) 12-13. 
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way, can the rights in no way be transferred by the payee of 
such cheque? This is also a disputed matter. 
According to s 14 of the German Cheque Act, a cheque 
payable to a particular person with the words 'not to order' 
added, cannot be transferred by indorsement. The rights 
flowing from such a cheque can, however, be transferred in 
this way and with the results of an ordinary cession. 135 The 
South African Act contains no similar provision. 
Malan and De Beer136 are of the opinion that only the cambial 
method of transfer is excluded, so that cession of the rights 
flowing from the cheque is still possible. Malan and 
Pretorius137 say thats 6(5) applies to the instrument only and 
prohibits its negotiation; it does not specifically deal with the 
rights embodied in it. They submit that words prohibiting 
transfer on a non-transferable cheque prevent the negotiation 
of the instrument but not necessarily a cession of the rights 
embodied in it. Accordingly, the rights embodied in a bill can 
be ceded. 138 
Malan and De Beer139 rely especially on the case of Trust 
Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd140• 
In this case the court had to determine the meaning of the 
words "this deposit voucher is neither transferable nor 
negotiable" on a deposit voucher. Botha JA who delivered the 
majority judgement said: 
"The deposit vouchers in question .... are not negotiable 
instruments, and the rights thereunder can ordinarily be 
135 See Hefennehl and Baumbach Baumbach - Hefermehl Wechselgesetz 
und Schechgesetz mit Nebengesetzen und einer EinfUhrung in das 
Werttapie"echt (1990) 17ed 549. 
136 para 118. 
137 1992 TSAR 77 91. 
138 See also Malan and Pretorius para 234. 
13
• para 118. 
140 1968 (3) SA 166 (A). 
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transferred from one person to another by way of cession 
under the common law. There seems to be all the more 
reason, therefore, that the words 'neither transferable nor 
negotiable' thereon should be given their ordinary literal 
meaning, namely that they are not to be transferred - in the 
only way in which they are capable of being transferred in 
law, i e by cession under the common law - from one 
person to another". 141 
The authors make a distinction between negotiable and 
non-negotiable instruments and say that the implication seems 
to be that had these words appeared on a bill, cheque or note 
they would have excluded their negotiability but not a cession 
of the rights embodied in them. According to Oelofse142 the 
majority view in Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard Bank 
of South Africa Ltd143 does not really provide support for the 
authors' opinion. In his view such an express indication of 
non- transferability also affects the possibility of cession. The 
author says that greater support is to be found in a few old 
cases which were still decided under the common law. In 
terms of the common law, a bill or promissory note made 
payable to a specific person, and not to him or his order, could 
not be negotiated further. 144 However, in Van der Merwe v 
Franck, 145, Jagger v Duncan,146, Ens/in v Haupt141 and 
Thompson, Watson and Co v Malan 148 it was held that the 
rights in terms of such a document could still be ceded. 149 
141 191. 
142 (1982) 4 Modern Business Law 51; (1987) 9 Modern Business Law 129 
135. 
143 1968 (3) SA 166 (A). 
144 See Cowen (1966) 4ed 65. 
145 1885 (2) SAR 26. 
146 1887 (2) SAR 214. 
147 1877 (7) Buchanan 58. 
148 1843 (2) Menzies 270. 
149 See also Malan, Oelofse and Pretorius Proposals for the Reform of the 
Bills of Exchange Act 1964 (1988) 557-558. 
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Today transferability can be excluded only by the addition of 
express words to that effect. 150 
It is submitted that Oelofse's view seems to be correct and it 
would appear that this view was also tacitly accepted in cases 
such as Johnson 151 and Gishen. 152 It seems illogical to 
distinguish between transferability in the cambial sense and 
transferability by ordinary cession when a cheque contains 
words clearly aimed at ensuring that only the payee receives 
payment. If cession was still possible, the drawer's intention 
would definitely be frustrated. Added to this is the fact that 
the drawee bank is obliged to carry out its customer's orders. 
This is the basis of the judgement in Johnson. Grosskopf AJ 
sums up his conclusion as follows : 
Concerning the things that went on I am of the opinion that 
the cheque in question is within the ramifications of s 6(5) 
of the Bills of Exchange Act, and was therefore not 
transferable. As a result therefore, in my view, the 
defendant gave the plaintiff instruction to pay the amount 
of the cheque to the payee, Tennant and Co, or as a result 
of the crossing, to pay to the payee's collecting bank. I do 
not have to decide which of these methods of payment 
would be correct, because the plaintiff did not follow one 
of them. The plaintiff had paid to Sonia Feinberg's 
collecting bank, and therefore the defendant in my view, 
gave no authority (our translation). 153 
Further support for the view that cession is also excluded by 
the words 'not transferable' and 'pay X only' is to be found in 
De Villiers and others NNO v Electronic Media Network 
(Pty) Ltd. 154 This case concerned an action for provisional 
sentence on a cheque drawn by the defendant in favour of a 
150 See ss 6(3) and 6(5). 
151 Volkskas Bank v Johnson 1979 (4) SA 775 (C). 
152 Gishen v Nedbank Ltd 1984 (2) SA 378 (W). 
153 779-780. 
154 1991 (2) SA 180 (W). 
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company. The cheque was marked 'not transferable'. The 
company was liquidated, but was afterwards discharged from 
liquidation as a result of a compromise in terms of s 311 of the 
Companies Act. 155 The plaintiffs were appointed as receivers 
in terms of the compromise. The court held that, in view of the 
words 'not transferable', only the company could be the 
holder of the cheque and therefore sue for provisional 
sentence. Unlike the position of a liquidator, a receiver is not 
a representative of a company. Therefore, the receivers could 
not sue for provisional sentence. In the course of his 
judgement, and after indicating how a cheque could be 
rendered non-transferable, Kirk - Cohen J stated the 
following: "That is what the defendant did in this case and the 
effect thereof would be... to prevent and eliminate the 
possibility of transfer of rights under the cheque (our 
emphasis), to any person other than GBS (the company)."156 
Oelofse's view does not, of course, mean that the exclusion of 
a cambial transfer necessarily also excludes cession. Cambial 
transfer can be excluded by the appropriate words, with 
retention of the possibility of a transfer by way of cession, for 
example, by placing the words 'indorsement not possible' on a 
cheque. This will clearly indicate that only a cambial transfer 
is excluded. The effect of restrictive words is, in the final 
analysis, determined by the interpretation of the words. 157 
155 Act 61 of 1973. 
156 183F. 
157 See Oelofse Rektawissel en Rektatjek, Verhandeling en Sessie in die 
Duitse en Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1987) 9 Modern Business Law 129 for 
a detailed discussion of the question as to whether the rights flowing from 
a non-transferable cheque can still be ceded. 
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6 The Amendment Bi11158 
Mofokeng and Pretorius159 make the following remarks in 
regard to the proposed amendments for non-transferable 
cheques: 
(a) The proposed s 75A states that only a cheque which 
contains the words not transferable written boldly 
across the face of it is to qualify as a 'not transferable 
cheque'. 
At present a cheque can be made non-transferable in a 
number of ways, eg, 'Pay X only', 160 or by placing the 
words 'not transferable' on it. 161 The general public is 
used to making a cheque non-transferable in a certain 
manner and it is educated to do so by the banks 
themselves. 162 The proposed amendment creates 
uncertainty. Are the common law ways to make a 
cheque non-transferable to be disregarded? 
Furthermore, when is boldly boldly enough? In other 
words, how is boldly to be determined? 
(b) Section 6(5) provides that if a bill contains words 
prohibiting transfer or indicating an intention that it 
should not be transferable, it is valid as between the 
parties to the bill, but not negotiable. Section 29(1) 
provides that a bill is negotiated if it is transferred from 
one person to another in such a manner as to constitute 
158 General notice 1427 Government Gazette 19075 of21July1998. 
159 Proposed Amendments to the Bills of Exchange Act 34of1964 (1999) 
11 SA Mere LJ 152. 
160 R Barkhan Finance Corporation v Dabros (Pty) Ltd 1968 (2) SA 686 
(A). 
161 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Sham Magazine Centre 1977 (1) SA 484 
(A) and see the discussion above as to the acceptable ways for making a 
cheque non-transferable. 
162 See in this regard the remarks of Combrink J in KwaMashu Bakery Ltd v 
The Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1995 (1) SA 377 (0) at 393A-C. 
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the transferee, holder of the bill. The proposed s 
75A(2) says that cheques which do not comply with the 
provisions of s 75(A)(l) will be negotiable. Does this 
mean that if a cheque is made payable to 'X only' and 
does not have the prescribed words 'not-transferable' 
written across the face of it, the named payee would be 
entitled to negotiate the cheque to Y, who then would 
be entitled to become holder or even holder in due 
course of the cheque? There is uncertainty here. 
Section 6(1) provides that a bill must be payable to 
bearer or to order in order to be negotiable. Ifs 75A(2) 
says that a cheque which does not comply with s 
75A(l) will be negotiable, the question is then whether 
such a cheque will be payable to bearer or to order in 
order to be negotiable within the meaning of s 6(1). 
This is not clear. It is also not clear what the meaning 
of the word 'negotiable' ins 75A(2) is. It is further not 
clear how these provisions will affect ss 29-32 (dealing 
with the negotiation and indorsement of cheques), and 
whether these cheques will be capable of being 
indorsed at all. 
The proposed s 75A(2) says that cheques that do not 
comply with the provisions of s 75A(l), that is, cheques 
that do not have the words not transferable written 
boldly across their face, will be negotiable. This 
provision creates confusion and in more ways than one 
conflicts with the existing Act. Assume that the drawer 
writes the words non transferable across the face of the 
cheque while he intended to write the words not 
transferable. On the literal reading of s 75A(l) such a 
cheque will not qualify as a non-transferable cheque. 
But in terms of s 6(5) this is clearly an indication of an 
intention to prohibit transfer of the cheque. The 
proposed amendment will disregard the clear intention 
of the drawer and such a cheque will be negotiable 
notwithstanding the provisions of s 6(5). 
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( c) The proposed amendment creates a lot of uncertainty 
and conflicts with the rest of the Act . It provides in 
s 75A that the words 'not transferable' must be written 
across the face by 'the drawer'. What happens if the 
words are, eg, written by the payee? This is not stated. 
In a dispute, who will decide which party wrote the 
words on the cheque and who will have the onus of 
proof? If the words are written by the payee, what will 
the effect of this be? Are the words to be disregarded 
and would the cheque become negotiable within the 
meaning of s 75A(2)? There is uncertainty here as well. 
(d) Section 75A is in the part of the Act dealing with 
'crossed cheques'. It is not clear whether the proposed 
non-transferable cheque has to be crossed in order to 
qualify as such. 
( e) Clause 40 proposes to amend s 84 by inserting a new 
subsection which provides that if a 'not transferable 
cheque' is delivered to a banker for collection, such 
banker would have such rights as it would have had, 
had it been the payee of such cheque. 
The proposed conferring of rights on the collecting 
banker here runs contrary to any existing legal 
principle. The effect of the proposal would be that 
rights are conferred on an outside party where the 
intention is that no one but the named payee should 
have any rights in the cheque. 163 Let it be explained. 
Although a non-transferable cheque is "valid as 
between the parties" in terms of s 6(5), it is not 
negotiable under the provisions of s 29. Only one 
person can be holder of such an instrument, namely, the 
payee. Thus a bank collecting payment of such a 
cheque on behalf of a customer cannot be holder or 
holder in due course. Nor will s 84 assist the bank 
163 Mofokeng and Pretorius 1999 SA Mere LJ 152 at 158 and 165. 
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because it applies only to cheques and certain other 
instruments payable to order. 164 The proposed clause 40 
gives to a collecting bank rights which it could not and 
should not have. When a cheque is made 
non-transferable the clear intention is that no-one but 
the named payee should have any rights in the cheque. 
(f) Finally, the answer to the argument that it has become 
too onerous for banks to recognise 'not transferable' 
cheques and that the costs for the banks is too much to 
bear, 165 has been given by Combrink J in KwaMashu 
Bakery Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd .166 
164 See Malan and De Beer para 349. 
165 See para 7 of the 'Backgrounder' to the Amendment Bill. 
166 1995 (1) SA 377 (0). At 393D-I the judge said : "The banks ... have 
even, prior to the decision in the Indac Electronics case (Indac 
Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 (1) SA 783 (A) which 
recognized that a collecting bank can be held liable for negligence under 
the extended lex Aquilia to the true owner of lost or stolen cheque) 
developed a system of checking that the proceeds of a non-transferable 
cheque go to the actual payee and not to someone not entitled thereto. 
This is not to say that the defendant has taken upon itself a duty which 
otherwise did not exist, because that would be a non sequitur, but it is of 
cardinal importance when considering whether such conduct can be 
reasonably expected from a banker. The analysis of the evidence above 
showed that the defendant requires the tellers to remove all cheques with 
restrictive endorsements and for a designated officer to examine such 
cheques and exercise a discretion as to whether further enquiry is 
necessary or not. This evidence also impacts on the argument regarding 
the costs associated with checking on non-transferable cheques because it 
appears that those costs have already been absorbed by the defendant 
without any difficulty. There was evidence that the commercial banks of 
South Africa adopted the following resolution: 
"Banks will deal with cheques, the transfer of which is prohibited by 
wording on the face thereof (such as 'not-transferable') in only one 
manner, namely by accepting them for the credit of an account bearing 
the identical name to that of the payee named on the cheque." 
The banks inter se accepted that it is a responsibility of a collecting bank 
to ensure that the instruments bearing non-transferable markings are 
Continued on next page ... 
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The authors' conclusion167 is that there is no compelling 
reason for the adoption of the amendment and that making not 
transferable cheques more easily identifiable will not in any 
way relieve banks of the duty imposed on them to act without 
negligence. After the decision of the Appellate Division in 
lndac Electronics, 168 even ifthe proposed s 75A will help the 
banks to identify not transferable cheques more easily, they 
still have to observe their common law duty for other cheques 
and 'not transferable' cheques as well. The wisdom therefore, 
of a separate provision for the non-transferable cheques, 
becomes questionable. Furthermore, the proposed amendment 
would create legal uncertainty and it is one-sided as it 
addresses only the concerns of the banking industry. 
It is submitted that the above conclusions of Mofokeng and 
Pretorius are correct. It is further submitted that the existing 
Act is heavily biased in favour of the banks. Add to that the 
fact that so-called bank usages can create law. 169 Whether or 
applied to accounts in the identical name of a payee's name thereon .... 
This demonstrates that the banks inter se do not regard it as too onerous a 
duty for a collecting banker to ensure that it collects only for the named 
payee." 
167 Mofokeng and Pretorius 1999 SA Mere LJ 152 at 156 and 165. 
168 Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 (1) SA 783 (A). 
See the discussion below in this regard. 
169 See the remarks in regard to bank usage of Somervell LJ in Arab Bank 
Ltd v Ross (1952) 2 QB 216 at 222 and those of Denning LJ at 227-228. 
In South Africa regarding the bank usage of charging interest on an 
overdrawn account see Senekal v Trust Bank of South Africa Ltd 1978 
(3) SA 375 (A) at 384F-H. In Standard Bank v Sham Magazine Centre 
1977 (1) SA 484 (A) Holmes JA remarked : "In my view it is 
inappropriate to endeavour to solve the problem by reference to the 
ordinary grammatical meaning of these words, divorced from the context 
of banking practice (it) and judicial interpretation over many years. One is 
not here dealing with ordinary language which is susceptible of 
interpretation by reference to consideration of grammar and plain 
meaning. One is dealing with an involved mystique of hieroglyphs such as 
Continued on next page ... 
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not the banks' practice (usage) constitutes law is a question of 
fact. 170 However, practices which have not acquired the status 
transverse parallel lines ; snatches from words such as 'and Co'; verbless 
expressions such as 'ale payee only,' and an inscription such as 'not 
negotiable' which has one meaning in relation to a bill of exchange and 
another meaning in relation to a crossed cheque, although a cheque is 
statutorily defined by a reference to a bill, and both are classified as 
negotiable instruments" (at 501-502). 
170Regarding the non-transferable cheques the banks initially decided not to 
pay a non-transferable cheque over the counter. It was further decided to 
accept a non-transferable cheque for collection only if the name of the 
payee on the cheque corresponded exactly to the name of the account for 
the credit of which collection took place (see November 1976 Financial 
Mail 821 and December 1976 Financial Mail 974). As far as payment 
over the counter is concerned, this resolution is no longer applied. 
Consequently, an uncrossed non-transferable cheque will be paid over the 
counter, provided that the person presenting it for payment can properly 
identify himself as the payee (see Cowen (1985) 5ed I 209 fn 130). In the 
meantime banks have given notice in the press (see eg the Citizen of 5 
August 1991) of a new resolution in connection with non-transferable 
cheques, applicable with effect from 19 August 1991. According to this 
resolution, uncrossed non-transferable cheques are no longer accepted for 
collection for the credit of a customer's account (see the discussion above 
in this regard). 
Since the banks' resolution obviously does not reflect an established 
practice, it cannot form part of the relationship between a bank and his 
customer (account holder) on the basis of banking usage (see Golden 
Cape Fruits (Pty) Ltd v Fotoplate (Pty) Ltd 1973 (2) SA 642 (C) 645). 
However, banks can avoid breach of their contracts of mandate with their 
customers (viz to collect cheques for their customers) by giving each 
customer reasonable notice of the introduction of the new practice. Since 
a bank can terminate the entire contract with its customers by giving 
reasonable notice (see Volkskas Bpk v van Aswegen 1961 (1) SA 493 
(A) 459-596; Cowen (1966) 4ed 481; Malan and De Beer para 328), it can 
also amend the contract on reasonable notice. The customer who does not 
wish to accept the amendment, can then terminate the contract. However, 
it will be of no avail to transfer his account to another bank, since the 
resolution is applied by all banks. Although the resolution is concerned 
primarily with the relationship between a customer and his bank, in its 
capacity as a collecting bank , it is also of secondary interest as regards the 
relationship between a customer and his drawee bank. According to the 
resolution, an uncrossed non-transferable cheque which is fortuitously 
accepted for collection, will be returned by the drawee bank bearing the 
following note: "unable to identify payee". 
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of law may form the foundation of contractual terms. 
Established and developing bank usage is a very important 
source of the law of cheques in particular and banking law in 
general. The Amendment Bill, instead of restoring the 
balance as it professes to do, 171 is even more biased in favour 
of the commercial banks. 172 
7 Liability of the drawee and collecting banks 
7.1 Whether a bank paying a non-transferable cheque to or 
collecting it for the wrong person incurs delictual liability to 
the true owner depends on whether the drawee or collecting 
bank can be delictually liable to the true owner of any cheque 
that has been stolen or lost. 173 Although a cheque is primarily 
an instrument of payment which is often not negotiated, it is 
nevertheless in principle a negotiable and transferable 
instrument. The drawer or the owner may suffer loss if a 
cheque is stolen or lost. For example, a thief can obtain 
payment of a cheque by devious means and then disappear 
without trace. A thief can also "negotiate" (through a forged 
indorsement) or sell a cheque to another person, who then 
obtains payment of the cheque. Theft or loss of a cheque can 
also cause the drawer or the true owner to lose his proprietary 
171See the objectives set out in clause 2 of the Amendment Bill. 
112For comprehensive proposals in this regard see Malan, Oelofse and 
Pretorius Proposals for the reform of the Bills of Exchange Act 1964 
(1998) 555ff and Oelofse, Stassen and Du Plessis Hersiening van die 
Wisselwet (1983) 5 Modern Business Law 67. See also Banking 
Services: Law and Practice Report by the Review Committee Cm 622 
February 1999 (Chairman R B Jack) 54 ff and Appendix M; Holden 
Suggested Reform of the Law relating to Cheques (1951) 14 Modern 
Law Review 33 44ff; Murray Crossed Checks, Account Payee and 
Non-Negotiable Checks : Some Suggestions from Foreign Law (1968) 
20 Hastings Law Journal 273; Malan The Liberation of the Cheque 
(1978) TSAR 107 114-115; Cowen Two Cheers (or maybe only one) for 
Negotiability - The Sham Magazine case: Its implications and 
Repercussions (1977) 40 THRHR 19. 
173 See Malan and De Beer para 354. 
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rights to, and his personal rights arising from the instrument, 
since it is possible for a subsequent possessor to become a 
holder in due course. 
Who the true owner of a cheque is, is a matter that must be 
determined according to the ordinary principles applicable to 
movable corporeals.174 The true owner is not defined in the 
Act but, it is submitted, is usually the person in possession of 
the cheque and out of whose possession it was stolen or 
lost.11s 
In order to found the liability of the possessor of a stolen or 
lost cheque to the owner, the cheque is in our law, seen mainly 
as a movable corporeal. In common law the owner of stolen 
property has no action for damages against a bona fide 
possessor of his property. The owner can only claim his 
property by using the rei vindicatio. In Leal and Company v 
Williams116 Innes CJ stated: 
"The remedy .... our law gives to the owner of stolen 
property is this: he may follow his property and vindicate it 
anywhere, provided it is still in esse. And he may bring an 
action ad exhibendum to recover the property or its value 
(should it have been sold or consumed) against the thief or 
his heirs, or against any person who has received it with 
knowledge of the tainted title" (our emphasis). 177 
174 First National Bank of SA Ltd v Quality Tyres (Pty) Ltd 1995 (3) SA 
556 (A) 568. The owner's name need not appear on the cheque : Holscher 
v ABSA Bank 1994 (2) SA 667 (T) 672-673; APA Network Consultants 
vABSA Bank Ltd 1996 (1) SA 1159 (W) 1167. 
175 See also Sharrock and Kidd 167. 
176 1906 TS 556. 
177 558-559. See also John Bell and Co Ltd v Esselen 1954 (1) SA 147 (A) 
153; Van der Westhuizen v McDonald and Mundel 1907 TS 933 
940-943; Campbell v Blue Line Association Ltd 1918 TPD 309 311-312; 
Morabane v Bateman 1928 AD 460 465-466; Kahn v Volschenk 1986 
(3) SA 84 (A); Secjin Bank Ltd v Mercantile Bank Ltd 1993 (2) SA 34 
(W). 
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According to this principle, the owner of stolen property 
cannot claim its value from a bona fide intermediary by means 
of the actio ad exhibendum. 178 He can only claim his property 
from the possessor using the rei vindicatio. As will appear 
later179 mere good faith no longer offers the collecting bank, 
through whose hands the stolen cheque passed any protection. 
If it can be proved that the collecting bank was negligent, it 
will indeed be liable to the true owner for the damages the 
latter suffered. 
The scope of these remedies is however, very limited. This is 
also the case with the action based on unjustified enrichment 
against a possessor who has either sold the lost or stolen 
cheque or obtained payment of it. 180 
The same applies to drawee or collecting banks that came to 
possess lost or stolen cheques. The traditional view is that a 
drawee or collecting bank is not liable in delict for negligence 
to the true owner of a lost or stolen cheque, but is liable only 
for ma/a .fides. 181 
7.2 In English law the collecting and drawee banks can incur 
liability for conversion to the true owner of a stolen or lost 
cheque. Liability for conversion is not part of South African 
law. 182 Whether in South African law the collecting or drawee 
178 The actio ad exhibendum is a delictual remedy in modem law (Sorvaag v 
Petterson and others 1954 (3) SA 636 (C)). See also Cowen The 
Liability of a Bank in the Computer Age in respect of a Stolen Cheque 
1981 TSAR 193 194ff. 
179 See the discussion below. 
180 See Van Der Westhuizen v McDonald and Mundel 1907 TS 933. A 
person who acquires a bill as holder in good faith and for value usually 
becomes a holder in due course entitled to the instrument and its 
proceeds. See further Malan and Pretorius para 114; Sinclair The rights 
of the True Owner of a Stolen Bill ( 1972) 89 SALJ 414. 
181 See Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1928 
WLD 251 280-283 where it was said that the bona fide possessor of stolen 
property is not liable to the true owner for the value of the property. 
182 See Malan and De Beer para 351. 
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bank can incur delictual liability for negligence183 to the owner 
of a stolen cheque depends, inter alia, on whether it owes him 
a duty of care. A duty of care is the outcome of a judicial 
value judgement embracing all relevant facts, including 
matters of policy. 184 South African courts have held that 
neither the drawee nor the collecting bank owes such a duty of 
care. 185 
7 .3 Collecting Banker is not defined in the Act, but several 
sections refer to the banks in that particular capacity. 186 The 
collecting bank plays an important role in the payment process 
of crossed cheques, since by virtue of the crossing the drawee 
bank must pay the cheque to a bank. 187 The collecting bank 
acts as an agent and performs its duties as mandatary. 188 The 
process of the collection of a cheque on behalf of a customer 
involves the conveyance of the instrument by the collecting 
bank to the bank on which it is drawn (the drawee bank), the 
receipt of the money from the drawee bank and the crediting 
of the amount received to the customer's account. This is 
usually done through a clearing house. A clearing house is the 
183 Generally, negligence will be found if -
(a) a diligens paterfamilias in the position of the defendant - (i) would 
foresee the reasonable possibility of his conduct injuring another in his 
person or property and causing him patrimonial loss ; and (ii) would 
take reasonable steps to guard against such occurrence; and (b) the 
defendant failed to take such steps ( per Holmes JA in Kruger v 
Koetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A) 430 E-F). 
When liability of a professional is in question, the standard of care against 
which his conduct has to be measured is that which may be expected of a 
person engaged in that profession (Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438 444). 
184 Administrateur Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A) 
833-834. See Malan 1979 De Jure 31 32-34; Van Der Walt 1979 TSAR 
145. 
185 See Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd v Standard Bank of &4 Ltd 1928 
WLD 251; Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Estate Van Rhyn 1925 
AD 266; Atkinson Oates Motors Ltd v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1977 
(3) SA 188 (W). See also Cowen 1981 TSAR 193. 
186 ss76(5); 84; 78(2), (3) and (4); 79; 81(2); and 81(5). 
187 s 78. 
188 Capital and Counties Bank Ltd v Gordon 1903 AC 240 (HL) 245. 
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place where representatives of various member banks meet to 
exchange cheques drawn on each other and to make or receive 
payment of balances and so to clear the transactions of the 
day on which the settlement is made. 189 
The recognition in South African law of the delictual liability 
of a collecting bank to the owner of a stolen or lost cheque 
was quite controversial. For years the South African courts 
dealt with the collecting bank in exactly the same way as they 
did with any person through whose hands stolen property had 
passed. Consequently, they consistently held that the 
collecting bank was liable only if intent on the part of such 
bank could be proved (ie if it was ma/a.fide). Negligence was 
not sufficient. 1900n the other hand, academic writers were as 
consistently in favour of liability for negligence. 191 
In contrast to the South African courts the Zimbabwean courts 
consistently held that the collecting bank was in fact liable for 
negligence. In Rhostar (Pvt) Ltd v Netherlands Bank of 
189 See Malan and De Beer para 311. See also Cowen 1981 TSAR 193. 
190 See Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1928 WLD 
251; Atkinson Oates Motors Ltd v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1977 (3) 
SA 188 (W); Worcester Advice Office v First National Bank of 
Southern Africa Ltd 1990 (4) SA 811 (C) (discussed by Nagel in (1991) 
24 De Jure 178 and by Malan and Pretorius in (1991) 54 THRHR 705); 
Bonitas Medical Aid Fund v Volkskas Bank Ltd and another 1992 (2) 
SA 42 (W). The only exception here was Bonitas Medical Aid Fund v 
Volkskas Bank Ltd and another 1991 (2) SA 231 (W), a judgement 
which is difficult to understand. See the discussion by Oelofse in 1991 SA 
MercLJ364. 
191 See eg De Beer Die Aanspreeklikheid van die lnvorderingsbankier 
teenoor die Ware Eienaar van 'n Tjek (1977) 40 THRHR 360; Tager 
The Collecting Banker's Liability to the true Owner of a Lost or 
Stolen Cheque 1979 SALJ 372; Malan Professional Responsibility and 
the Payment and Collection of Cheques (1978) 11 De Jure 326 and 
(1979) 12 De Jure 31 (also see the supplement in 1979 De Jure 363); 
Pretorius Professionele Aanspreeklikheid, die lnvorderingsbank en 
Regshervorming (1987) 9 Modern Business Law 56. The exception here 
was Cowen (The Liability of a Bank in the Computer Age in respect of 
a Stolen Cheque 1981 TSAR 193). 
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Rhodesia Ltd192and Phi/sham Investments (Pvt) Ltd v 
Beverley Building Society and another 193 the court held the 
collecting bank liable. In Zimbabwe Banking Corporation 
Ltd v Pyramid Motor Corporation (Pvt) Ltd, 194 the supreme 
court of Zimbabwe confirmed the view taken in the Rhostar 
and Phi/sham cases. According to the court, it is incorrect to 
treat a collecting bank in exactly the same way as a bona fide 
purchaser of stolen property, who is liable only for intentional 
unlawful disposition of such property. In his judgement 
Gubbay JA stated, inter alia, the following: 
"The collecting banker appreciates or ought to appreciate the 
significance of instructions upon a cheque and that they 
are there to be observed. He can verify whether the payee 
designated on the cheque is his client. He alone is in a 
position to know whether it is being collected on behalf of 
the person entitled to receive payment; the paying banker 
has no knowledge of that... If the cheque indicates that his 
client is not so entitled, the collecting banker is able to 
safeguard the drawer from loss by acting as a buffer. He 
has the machinery at his disposal to do so. He can allow a 
reasonable period of time to elapse before paying out to his 
client the funds represented by the cheque, thereby 
permitting either enquiries to be made as to the depositor's 
title, or the drawer an adequate opportunity to instruct the 
drawee bank to stop payment on the cheque. By exercising 
reasonable diligence in this regard the collecting banker is 
able to minimise, if not neutralise, the relatively high risk 
affecting a cheque in the sense that payment can be 
192 1972 (2) SA 703 (R). The case is discussed by Sinclair in 1973 SALJ 
369. 
193 1977 (2) SA 546 (R). 
194 1985 (4) SA 553 (ZSC). 
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obtained by an unlawful possessor with comparative 
ease."195 
With regard to South African case law, the matter eventually 
came before the Appellate Division in Indac Electronics (Pty) 
Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd. 196 The Appellate Division decided 
on exception that a collecting bank is indeed liable for 
damages to the true owner, under the extended lex Aquilia, 197 
if such bank negligently collects the amount of a cheque for 
the wrong person. 198 This judgement therefore reflects the 
current legal position. 199 
195 at 565F-I. This judgement was also followed in Bank of Credit and 
Commerce Zimbabwe Ltd v UDC Ltd 1991 (4) SA 82 (ZSC). An 
interesting aspect of this decision is that the court made a finding of 
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff (the true owner) and 
consequently awarded a reduced amount of damages. 
I% 1992 (1) SA 783(A). This judgement is discussed in 1992 THRHR 314 
by Nagel and Greeff, in (1992) 21 Modern Business Law 211 by Visser 
and in 1992 Stellenbosch LR 115 by Hugo. Hugo (The Negligent 
Collecting Bank: Recent Decisions Introduce a New Era (1992) 3 
Stellenbosch LR 115 129-130) is of the view that the collecting bank 
should also be held liable for negligent collection, in spite of the fact that 
it became a holder in due course of the cheque. However, this creates an 
unacceptable anomaly. On the one hand, the bank has an indisputable 
right derived from the fact that it is a holder in due course. On the other, it 
is held liable for negligent collection. It is only logical that the fact that 
the bank became a holder in due course would eliminate any possible 
liability for negligence. 
197Provided all the requirements of Aquilian liability have been met. They 
are: the act, unlawfulness, fault, causation and damage. See Neethling et 
al Law of Delict (1990) 2lff. 
198 See 797C-E of the judgement for the elements which the plaintiff has to 
prove. They are : (a) that the collecting bank had received payment of the 
cheque on behalf of someone who had not been entitled to payment; (b) 
that in receiving such payment the collecting bank had acted unlawfully 
and negligently; (c) that the conduct of the collecting bank had caused the 
owner to sustain loss, and (d) that the damage claimed represented proper 
compensation for such loss. 
199 In the meantime, the lndac Electronics case has been applied in Volkskas 
Continued on next page ... 
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In lndac Electronics the plaintiff was the true owner of a 
crossed order cheque marked "not negotiable" and made 
payable to lndac Electronics. The defendant collected the 
cheque on behalf of a certain Le Roux who was not entitled to 
receive payment. There was no indorsement on the back of the 
cheque. The plaintiff instituted action in the Transvaal 
Provincial Division alleging that the defendant had, in breach 
of duty, negligently caused loss to the plaintiff. The defendant 
excepted on the basis that in the absence of actual knowledge 
on its part, it was under no legal duty to avoid dealing 
negligently with a cheque. The exception was upheld and the 
plaintiff appealed.200 
One of the elements of Aquilian liability that must be met is 
unlawfulness.201 The court pointed out that unlawfulness 
depends on whether the defendant was under a duty not to act 
negligently. This duty concept can be regarded as "a device of 
Bank Bpk v Bonitas Medical Aid Fund 1993 (3) SA 779 (A); Fedgen 
Insurance Ltd v Bankorp Ltd 1994 (2) SA 399 (W); Holscher v ABSA 
Bank en 'n ander 1995 (2) SA 667(T). See further Malan and Pretorius 
Questions of Negligence and the Collecting Bank: A Brief History of 
the Bonitas Trilogy (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 116; Malan and Pretorius 
Liability of the Collecting Bank: More Clarity? (1994) 6 SA Mere LJ 
218. The matter in Volkskas Bank Bpk v Bonitas Medical Aid Fund 
1993 (3) SA 779 (A) did go to trial but no evidence was led to rebut the 
prima facie indication of the existence of a legal duty on the part of a 
collecting bank to prevent loss by negligently dealing with the cheque in 
question (at 790D-E). 
200In upholding the exception, Eloff DJP considered himself bound by the 
earlier Witwatersrand Local Division decisions in Yorkshire Insurance 
Co Ltd v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1928 WLD 251 and Atkinson Oates 
Motors Ltd v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1977 (3) SA 188 (W). In both 
these cases it was held that in the absence of actual knowledge of its 
customer's defective title there existed no legal duty on the part of a 
collecting bank to avoid dealing negligently with a lost or stolen cheque. 
See Pretorius 1990 Annual Survey 319ff for a discussion of the historical 
development leading up to the decision in Indac Electronics. 
201The exception in Indac Electronics was taken solely on the grounds that 
the facts alleged by the plaintiff did not support a legal duty on the part of 
the defendant not to act negligently, and therefore that the defendant's 
conduct was not unlawful (797E-F). 
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judicial control over the area of actionable negligence on 
grounds of policy."202 It involves a "value judgement that the 
plaintiff's invaded interest is deemed worthy of legal 
protection against negligent interference."203 The 
considerations the court regarded as important in establishing 
whether a collecting bank owes a duty of care to the owner of 
a lost or stolen cheque are : 
(a) There would be no question of indeterminate or limitless 
liability, as is sometimes feared in cases involving pure 
economic loss, since the potential claimants can only be the 
true owner of the cheque, and he is identifiable on the face of 
the cheque. Furthermore, each potential claim will arise 
separately from any other and will be related to a specific act 
on the part of the collecting banker.204 
(b) The true owner faces an ever-present risk when using a 
cheque since payment can be obtained by an unlawful 
possessor with relative ease. There is, therefore, a need for 
protection in the case of the true owner of a cheque, 
particularly as he relies on the collecting banker to look at the 
named payee on the face of the cheque before collecting and 
wz 797H. 
WJ 7971. 
2047980-E. See also Zimbabwe Banking Corp Ltd v Pyramid Motor Corp 
(Pvt) Ltd 1985 (4) SA 553 (ZSC) where the court remarked that "in an 
action based on a cheque in circumstances such as the present (ie 
instances where the potential delictual liability of the collecting bank may 
arise) the potential plaintiffs are limited to two and are easily predictable, 
namely the drawer of the cheque or the payee (or persons holding title 
under him); indeterminate liability for economic loss does not arise since 
the loss will be restricted to the amount ex facie the cheque itself; and 
there is and will only be a single loss with title, if any, likelihood of a 
multiplicity of actions. I find this a cogent and acceptable proposition, 
which has earned the approval of academic writers". 5640-1. See further 
Malan Professional Responsibility and the Payment and Collection of 
Cheques (1978) 11 De Jure 326, (1979) 12 De Jure 31 38; First 
National Banko/SA Ltdv Quality Tyres (1970) ((Pty) Ltd 1995 (3) SA 
556 (A) 568ff. 
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paying the cheque which his customer handed to him for 
collection. 205 
( c) Taking into account the skill of the collecting banker in his 
field and his understanding of instructions written on the 
cheque the court regarded him as being able to reduce or 
avoid loss to the true owner by excercising reasonable care in 
collecting cheques. The court said that if there were no legal 
duty to take reasonable care, it would mean that the collecting 
banker need not examine or even look at the cheque to 
ascertain to whom it is payable. The crossing of a cheque 
would be of little consequence if no legal duty existed on the 
part of the collecting banker.206 
( d) The court pointed out that the collecting banker is the only 
person who is in a position to know whether or not a cheque is 
being collected on behalf of a person who is entitled to receive 
payment, and the drawee bank has to rely on the collecting 
banker to ascertain this fact. The collecting banker is fully 
aware of this position and therefore it is his duty to ensure that 
he only presents a cheque for payment on behalf of a client 
who is entitled to receive payment of the cheque.207 
( e) In the absence of an action against the collecting banker, 
the true owner of a cheque is without recourse where the 
cheque has been collected for the wrong person. But the 
collecting banker has recourse against his customer. Should 
the customer be unable to pay, it is "more appropriate to visit 
liability on the banker who chose to accept his customer's 
business than on an innocent true owner."208 
205 798l-799B. 
206799B-E. 
207799E-G. 
208799H-I. See also Pretorius Professionele Aanspreeklikheid, die 
Invorderingsbank en Regshervorming (1987) 9 Modern Business Law 
56 64 fn 72. 
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The court also dealt with the argument that the recognition of 
a legal duty on the part of the collecting bank will slow down 
banking and significantly increase the cost thereof. This, 
according to the court, can only be evaluated in the light of 
such evidence as may be led at trial and relates "not only to 
the issue of unlawfulness, but also that of the standard of care, 
an entirely distinct issue ... ".209 
Finally, the contention that a change of law in this regard is 
more properly a matter for Parliament was dismissed by the 
court. It stated: "The issue is one of law. The policy 
considerations are of a nature which is not infrequently the 
concern of Courts of law. "210 
Taking into account all the above factors211 the court 
considered that they operated "in favour of recognising the 
existence of a legal duty on the part of the collecting banker to 
the true owner of a lost or stolen cheque to avoid causing him 
pure economic loss by negligently dealing with such 
cheque."212 
209 8001. 
210 801D. 
211 See also Malan, Oelofse and Pretorius Proposals for the Reform of the 
Bills of Exchange Act, 1964 (1988) 592ff and Malan and Pretorius The 
Collecting Bank Revisited (1991) 54 THRHR 705 707ff for a full 
discussion of other relevant considerations. For further discussion of the 
lndac Electronics case, see Malan and Pretorius Negligence and the 
Collecting Bank : Liability at last? (1993) 5 SA Mere LJ 206; Kidd 
Can a Collecting Banker be held liable under the Lex Aquilia? Recent 
Developments and Some Thoughts on the Future (1993) 110SALJ1. 
212 801A-B. It may be pointed out here that the facts in lndac Electronics 
indicate prima facie negligence. The bank accepted an order cheque 
which contained no indorsement for the account of someone other than 
the payee of the cheque. The cheque in question was never paid in due 
course, since the respondent did not pay to a holder (the cheque was never 
indorsed by the appellant). Section 58 could not be used to protect the 
respondent since there was no attempt to forge the appellant's signature. 
Continued on next page ... 
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The next case in which the principles set out in Indac 
Electronics213 were applied is Volkskas Bank Bpk v Bonitas 
Medical Aid Fund.214 A cheque of R2 million was drawn on 
Nedbank by Bonitas in favour of Volkskas Bank (the 
appellant). The cheque was crossed. The words "not 
transferable" appeared between the two lines of the crossing. 
The printed word "bearer" was deleted. The cheque was 
therefore non-transferable.215 The cheque was presented to the 
appellant for collection by Eurotrust, a customer of the 
Furthermore, the payee's account was not credited and consequently s 83 
could also not be used to protect the respondent. The respondent here had 
acted botli as collecting bank and as drawee bank. If it is accepted that tlie 
respondent was negligent (which was prima facie tlie case), s 79 could 
also not be used to protect tlie respondent as drawee bank. The negligence 
of tlie respondent at its Wonderboom South branch could be ascribed to 
the respondent as a whole (see the remarks in Volkskas Bank Bpk v 
Bankorp Bpk (h-a Trust Bank) en 'n ander 1991 (3) SA 605 (A) at 
61 IE-F, and those in Eskom v First National Bank of Southern Africa 
Ltd 1995 (2) SA 386 (A) at 400B-C. Also see Malan and Pretorius (1996) 
8 SA Mere LJ 282 at 286-287; Oelofse (1991) 3 SA Mere LJ 364 379ft). 
Therefore, the respondent's payment never discharged the cheque and the 
respondent remained contractually liable to the appellant, both on the 
underlying obligation and as drawer of the cheque. In these circumstances 
tlie appellant did not suffer damages as result of tlie payment made to Le 
Roux. The appellant's correct remedy was therefore a contractual claim 
based on the cheque or on tlie underlying obligation. 
As the law stands at the moment, it would seem tliat tlie true owner may 
elect either to rely on the cheque itself or on the underlying obligation , or 
to disregard the requirement of damage and institute a delictual claim. See 
in tliis regard Oelofse Die Posisie van die Trekker en die Betrokkene 
Bank na Onrei!lmatige Betaling van 'n Tjek (1983) 5 Modern Business 
Law 12 at 19-20 for criticism of the latter possibility. 
213 Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 (1) SA 783 (A). 
214 1993 (3) SA 779 (A) 785. The case is discussed by Pretorius in 1993 
Annual Survey 484-485. It is mentioned (fn 199) that although the matter 
in Bonitas did go to trial no evidence was led to rebut the prima facie 
indication of the existence of a legal duty on the part of the collecting 
banker to prevent loss by negligently dealing with the cheque in question 
(See tlie remarks of Van Heerden JA at 790D-E in tliis regard). This , 
according to Prof Pretorius (1993 Annual Survey 485), might be 
explained by the fact tliat tlie trial ended before the decision in Indac 
Electronics. 
215 s 6(5). 
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appellant. The appellant presented the cheque to Nedbank, 
received payment, and credited the account of Eurotrust. 
Shortly thereafter Eurotrust was liquidated. The respondent 
instituted an action for damages in a Local Division against 
the appellant, claiming R2 million, the amount of the cheque, 
plus interest. The respondent alleged that by reason of the 
appellant's intentional or negligent conduct consisting of a 
failure to appropriate the amount of the cheque, in favour only 
of the appellant in accordance with the payment instruction on 
the cheque; that in conflict with the instruction the account of 
Eurotrust had been credited, and that because of the 
insolvency of the latter the amount could not be recovered 
from Eurotrust. The action against the appellant succeeded. 
On appeal it was, inter alia, contended for the appellant (a) 
that the appellant's officials had not acted negligently and 
further that they had not acted negligently vis-a-vis the 
respondent as a reasonable bank official would not have 
foreseen prejudice to the respondent, and (b ), relying on s 79, 
that the negligent failure of the appellant's officials had not 
prejudiced the respondent because the latter was still in the 
position in which it would have been had the appellant 
collected the cheque for its own account. 
As to (a) above, the court found that the appellant's duty of 
care required that the collection of the cheque had to be done 
strictly in accordance with the payment instruction on the 
cheque, and that had not occurred because the bank's officials 
(a teller and an official charged with checking) had simply not 
noticed that the cheque was payable to the appellant only, or if 
they had noticed it, they had ignored the restrictive crossing. 
There was little doubt that the bank's officials had indeed 
been negligent: the crossing and the name of the payee had 
been clearly inscribed on the cheque; any reasonable bank 
official would have noticed them, and there could be no 
excuse for the payment instruction having been ignored.216 It 
21
• 791H-792A. 
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was also found that any reasonable bank official would have 
foreseen that, had the cheque been collected for the account of 
the appellant, the respondent would not have suffered 
damages, but that the respondent could be prejudiced if in the 
collection process the payment instruction was not obeyed.217 
As to (b ), the court found that although the appellant had been 
placed in possession of the cheque, the acquisition of 
possession was not by the payee qua payee as required by s 
79. Further, that the cheque had been delivered to the 
appellant by Eurotrust which had represented that it was 
entitled to the proceeds of the cheque. Therefore, Eurotrust 
had never contemplated delivering the cheque to the appellant 
as payee; the appellant had also not contemplated taking 
possession of and dealing with the cheque as payee.218 The 
appeal was dismissed. 
The liability of a collecting bank as a result of a negligent 
collection for an unlawful possessor again received attention 
in Fedgen Insurance Ltd v Bankorp Ltd.219 Fedgen owed an 
amount of approximately R26 000 to a company named RH 
Johnson Crane Hire (Pty) Ltd ("Johnson"). Fedgen drew a 
cheque for this amount in favour of "RH Johnson Crane Hire 
(Pty) Ltd". It was therefore an order cheque.220 The cheque 
was posted to Johnson's broker, but it did not reach its 
destination and was presumably stolen. The cheque was 
deposited in an account at Bankorp and payment was received 
from the drawee bank. When the cheque was deposited, it 
contained a forged indorsement. The indorsement consisted of 
a rubber stamp with the name "RH Johnson Crane Hire" and 
an address. Since Johnson had not authorised the posting of 
the cheque, Fedgen remained the true owner of the cheque. 
Fedgen then instituted a claim for damages based on negligent 
217 792-793. 
218 793-794. 
21
• 1994 (2) SA 399 (W). 
220 s 6(3). 
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collection against Bankorp. It was not disputed that the 
drawee bank's payment had discharged the cheque. In this 
regard s 83(1) was relied on, but since the indorsement was a 
forgery, it seems that it was rather s 58 or 79 that applied. 
The judgement in Fedgen accepted the existence of a duty of 
care221 and was more concerned with the question of 
negligence on the part of the collecting bank. The judgement 
does not add much to what was already said in the Indac 
Electronics case.222 Nevertheless, the Fedgen judgement 
brings more clarity on the degree of care expected of a 
collecting bank. As one could expect, Fedgen relied on the 
fact that the indorsement did not correspond exactly with the 
name of the payee on the cheque. As far as that is concerned, 
it was rightly held223 that the difference between the name of 
the payee and the indorsement was not so great that it should 
have aroused any suspicion about the validity of the 
indorsement. The claim was accordingly dismissed. 
Another case concerning the liability of the collecting bank, is 
that of Holscher v ABSA Bank en 'n ander.224 The judgement 
is of interest because it clearly indicates that even after 
221 At 411 of the judgement Van Zyl J observed : "If it is accepted, as I 
believe it should be, that a legal duty or duty of care exists in the present 
instance (such in fact being common cause between the parties), and ifthe 
elements of causation and loss or damage are not in dispute, it follows that 
the only remaining issue is whether or not the defendant was negligent. 
This would be established if it can be proved that the defendant, as 
collecting banker, acted in breach of his legal duty aforesaid by not 
exercising reasonable care .... it is clear that this does not mean that a 
banker must examine every cheque minutely to determine whether the 
customer has title thereto. But if, in the course of the transaction, 
something unusual, untoward and anomalous should attract his attention 
or arouse his suspicion, it may reasonably be expected of him to institute 
an enquiry and to take such steps as may be required to prevent loss or 
damage. This is the standard of care which one would expect of .. . the 
bonus argentarius." 
222 Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 (l) SA 783 (A). 
223 41 lJ-412. 
224 1994 (2) SA 667(T). 
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delivery of a cheque by the drawer, the payee thereof is not 
necessarily the true owner of the cheque.225 Secondly, the 
court held that the claim against the collecting bank had to be 
reduced by the amount which could have been recovered from 
the eventual recipient of the money. As far as this aspect is 
concerned, in our view the judgement is clearly wrong. The 
court's approach in this regard has never been argued or 
accepted in the earlier cases.226 
The salient facts in the Holscher case were the following : On 
his retirement, Holscher was entitled to an amount of pension 
money. He wished to invest the full amount with the well 
known insurer Old Mutual. On Holscher's instructions the 
managing director of D, a company acting as Holscher's 
broker, requested the pension fund to furnish a cheque for the 
pension money made payable to Old Mutual. The pension 
fund drew a cheque for the amount due on the Standard Bank, 
crossed it and marked it "not transferable". The cheque was 
made payable to Old Mutual, was sent to D and received on 
behalf of D by H. H deposited the cheque in D's account at 
ABSA Bank. ABSA bank collected the amount of the cheque 
from Standard Bank and credited D's account with it. Shortly 
after the cheque was received by D and deposited in its 
account, Holscher telephoned H for advise on the type of 
investment that should be made with Old Mutual. To his 
astonishment H told him that he (H) had deposited the money 
in the account of his company (D), that D was insolvent and 
that Holscher could not be repaid. D was in fact wound up 
thereafter. Holscher then decided to sue ABSA bank for 
damages in the amount of the cheque. Although Old Mutual 
was originally cited as second defendant, no legal relief was 
sought against it. It is clear that Old Mutual had no liability at 
all towards Holscher. ABSA Bank closed its case without 
tendering any explanation why a non-transferable cheque had 
225 672H-673C. 
22
• See Malan and Pretorius para 251 fn 85; Van der Linde The Liability of 
a Collecting Bank for Negligence 1995 Juta's Business Law 10 11. 
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been collected for the account of someone other than the 
payee. Holscher never proved a case against the insolvent 
company, nor did he try to recover the money from H. 
There were two issues at the trial: 
(a) Was Holscher the true owner of the cheque, and was he 
entitled to claim damages from ABSA Bank? 
(b) Did Holscher prove that his damage was the amount of 
the cheque? 
As far as the first point is concerned, the court pointed out227 
that the payee of a cheque is not necessarily also the true 
owner thereof. An example of this is the case of a cheque that 
is to be posted to a creditor on his instructions. It is clear that 
the drawer remains the true owner until the cheque is 
posted.228 In the instant case the cheque was delivered, but not 
to the payee, Old Mutual. The cheque was delivered to 
Holscher's agent who did have authority to receive it on his 
behalf.229 Accordingly, Holscher was the true owner of the 
cheque when it was deposited in D's account. The mere fact 
that the true owner's identity did not appear from the cheque 
itself, does not mean that the collecting bank had no legal duty 
221 672I-673C. 
22
• See Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) 
ltd 1978 (4) SA 901 (N); Mannesmann Demang (Pty) Ltd v Romatex 
and another 1988 (4) SA 383 (D); Goldfields Confectionery Bakery Ltd 
v Norman Adam (Pty) Ltd l 950 (2) SA 763 (T); Dadoo and Sons Ltd v 
Administrator Transvaal 1954 (2) SA 442 (T); HK Outfitters (Pty) Ltd 
v Legal and General Assu"ance Society Ltd 1975 (1) SA 55 (T). In 
Barclays National Bank v Wall 1983 (1) SA 149 (A) Blackwell JA said: 
"What is the law governing the position where a debtor sends a cheque to 
his creditor through the post and the cheque is stolen and negotiated? If 
the creditor has requested the debtor to post him a cheque, or to send him 
a cheque by post - the post office being mentioned in specific terms - then 
according to both English and South African authorities, the debtor is 
considered to have discharged his debt as soon as he deposits a valid 
cheque in the post .... an implied request (is) equal in it legal implications 
to an express one" (at 444-445). 
22
• See also Coetzee v ABSA Bank Bpk 1997 ( 4) SA 85 (T) 90H. 
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towards him. The court rightly indicates230 that a bank knows 
that a cheque may belong to someone whose identity does not 
appear from the cheque, and that there is no reason why the 
bank should have a lesser duty to such a true owner. 
Accordingly, Holscher did have a delictual cause of action on 
the basis of ABSA Bank's unlawful and negligent conduct 
with respect to the cheque. 
As far as the second point is concerned, namely whether 
Holscher had suffered damage in the full amount of the 
cheque, the court followed a line of reasoning that has 
apparently not been raised before. Briefly the court's 
reasoning can be summarised as follows: 231 Firstly, the legal 
remedy against a thief himself is the recovery of what has 
been stolen, be it money or property. What can be claimed 
from the collecting bank is damages only. Secondly, ABSA 
Bank's conduct not only caused damage to Holscher, but it 
also created claims against D and H. If it appears that any of 
these claims has substantive value, such value must be taken 
into account in reduction of the damage, and therefore in 
reduction of the claim against the collecting bank. Since it was 
clear that Holscher would have received a dividend of at least 
R2 400 from the insolvent estate, had he proved a claim 
against the estate, the court gave judgement for the face value 
of the cheque less R2 400. Since there was no evidence 
whether H was solvent or insolvent, or even on the question 
whether he was still alive or still in the country, the mere 
possibility of a claim against him was left out of account. 232 
As far as the court's finding on the second point is concerned, 
we respectfully disagree with the court. The court's approach 
does not accord with the fact that the actio ad exhibendum is 
recognized in our law. This action can be used to claim 
damages from someone who ma/a fide has got rid of someone 
230 673E. 
231 See 673G-674A. 
232 675H. 
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else's property. The owner is not obliged to go and recover his 
property with a rei vindicatio from the eventual processor.233 
In any event, Holscher's claim against D and H was apart 
from a possible enrichment claim against D, also merely for 
damages. There were no specific bank notes or coins which 
could be identified as stolen. The mere fact that the collection 
of the cheque also led to the foundation of a claim against D 
(whether based on delict or on unjustified enrichment), does 
not in itself mean that Holscher had suffered less damage than 
the amount of the cheque. Only after Holscher had already 
recovered something from D, could the collecting bank say 
with justification that Holscher's damage had been reduced to 
the same extent. 
In KwaMashu Bakery Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa 
Ltd234 the liability of a collecting bank as a result of negligent 
collection for an unlawful possessor was again in issue. The 
case concerned cheques made payable to "KwaMashu Bakery 
Ltd only". It follows that the cheques were non-transferable. 
After the cheques had been stolen, an account was opened 
under the name "K waMashu Bakery Ltd Soccer Club". The 
cheques were deposited in that account, and payment was 
obtained. The court held the collecting bank liable. The name 
of the account into which the cheques were deposited, differed 
from the name of the payee on the cheques, and simply for 
this reason the collecting bank was negligent.235 However, the 
importance of the judgement lies in the court's finding that 
already at the stage of the opening of the account, the 
collecting bank has to take reasonable steps to ensure that the 
person opening the account is indeed who he purports to be.236 
If the thief attempts to open an account under the exact name 
of the payee as it appears on the cheque, the damage can be 
averted only if the bank at that stage already takes reasonable 
233 see Leal and Co v Williams 1906 TS 554 at 558-559. 
234 1995 (1) SA 377 (D). 
235 397G-H. 
236 3951-J -396A-B. 
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steps to ensure that it is not a "false" account that is being 
opened. The KwaMashu Bakery case is also important 
because it establishes a duty of care on the part of a collecting 
bank. In the light of the evidence presented the court had to 
reconsider the existence of a legal duty on the part of a 
collecting bank to the true owner of a lost or stolen cheque to 
avoid causing him pure economic loss by dealing negligently 
with such cheque. The court concluded that "there is nothing 
in the evidence which has persuaded me to depart from the 
prima facie finding of the Appellate Division (in Indac 
Electronics) that there exists a duty on the part of the 
collecting banker. Nor has it been demonstrated that the 
factors taken into account by the appellate division in reaching 
such conclusion are unfounded or inapplicable."237 The 
evidence actually weighed in favour of imposing the duty of 
care, for it revealed that : 
(a) The public makes use of the non-transferable cheque 
particularly when large sums of money are involved and is 
aware of the value of a non-transferrable cheque. The public is 
in need of the protection against a possible loss which could 
be incurred when using this type of cheque.238 
(b) The banks have, even prior to the decision in Indac 
Electronics,239 developed a system of checking that the 
proceeds of a non-transferable cheque goes to a named payee 
and not to someone not entitled thereto, and this impacts on 
the argument regarding the costs associated with checking on 
such cheques since it appeared from the evidence presented 
that these costs had already been absorbed by the defendant 
without difficulty.240 
237 392. 
238 393. It was pointed out there that the "non-transferable cheque reflects in 
modem society what most people want and use a cheque for - not for 
negotiation between a variety of holders, but as payment to one person" 
(our emphasis). 
23
• Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltdv Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 (1) SA 783 (A). 
240 393. 
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( c) There was evidence that the commercial banks of South 
Africa adopted a resolution to the effect that non-transferable 
cheques may only be accepted for the credit of an account 
bearing the identical name to that of the payee named on the 
cheque. This resolution means that the banks themselves do 
not regard it as too onerous a duty for a collecting bank to 
ensure that it collects only for the named payee.241 
( d) Although there are costs involved with the existence of a 
duty, the court was of the opinion that they were not 
disproportionate to the harm which is guarded against.242 The 
court referred to the evidence presented on behalf of the 
defendant bank that the amount ofR47.8 million represented a 
scenario where each and every non-transferable cheque had to 
be followed up and investigated.243 In many cases, although 
there may be a discrepancy between the name of the payee 
and the name on the deposit slip, the depositor is a well 
known client of the bank. Even if the cheque goes into the 
wrong account the designated officer knows that, because of 
the standing of the customer, the amount of the cheque will be 
241 393. The full text of this agreement is quoted in Bonitas Medical Aid 
Fund v Volkskas Bank 1992 (2) SA 42 (W) at 46G-47A. 
242 3931. 
243 The evidence presented on behalf of the defendant bank was aimed at 
demonstrating that because of the present same day clearing system in 
operation in South Africa and the bank procedure at present, and given the 
volume of cheques handled per day, it is not possible for a collecting bank 
to discharge the duty of care sought to be imposed in regard to the true 
owner of a cheque. It was also not possible because of the time frame 
available to banks to achieve same day clearance and even logistically 
impossible to make the number of phone calls to either the drawer or the 
drawee bank to inquire about irregularity of the non-transferable cheques. 
The defendant also presented the court with certain statistics regarding the 
volume of cheques handled by the banks. About 370 million cheques are 
presented for collection each year which represented a value of six billion 
Rand (388). Some 54 million of these cheques are non-transferable, 
representing approximately 35% of the value of all cheques drawn (R2 
billion). According to the evidence, the possible cost involved in the 
checking procedures for non-transferable cheques could be around R47.8 
million (388). 
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recovered with ease. 244 As to the argument that the duty would 
impact adversely on the same day clearance system, the court 
said that there is, in principle, no reason why there should not 
be an extended clearance period for problem cheques.245 
( e) Telephonic enquiries to the drawee bank could be avoided 
by some minor adjustments to the computer software to give 
the bank official, who is making further enquiries on the 
cheque, access to the full name of the depositor.246 
(f) The court noted that the "one argument which is 
unanswerable is that if there is no duty of care owned by a 
collecting banker, the banks need not bother to even look at 
cheques which are deposited for collection to ascertain 
whether the depositor is the named payee".247 It continued as 
follows: 
"(l)t offends against one's sense of fairness and 
reasonableness for bankers who by statute are the only 
institutions who are entitled to take and collect negotiable 
instruments and are regarded by society as professional 
persons and institutions competent in dealing with money 
matters to on the one hand, procure custom by inviting the 
public to bank with them and representing that they will 
collect cheques on behalf of their customers and on the 
other hand saying 'there is a risk that when we collect a 
cheque it may not be for the true owner but although we are 
aware of this risk it is going to cost us too much to guard 
against it and therefore we are going to take no steps to 
protect the true owner.' ... (I)t lies ill in the mouth of the 
person who does an act which creates a certain risk to aver 
that because guarding against the risk is very expensive it is 
therefore not liable. The absurdity of such a proposition 
244 393-394. 
245 395. 
246 394. 
247 394. 
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appears from its logical result being that, the more risky 
and the more dangerous a venture undertaken by a person 
who does not have to undertake that venture and more it 
would cost to safeguard against such a risk materialising, 
the less likely he is to be held liable, because of the cost 
being too high."248 
Because of the above considerations the court was satisfied 
that there should be a legal duty on the part of the collecting 
bank to the true owner of the lost or stolen cheque to avoid 
causing him loss by negligently collecting the amount of the 
cheque for the wrong person. 249 As far as the standard of care 
was concerned the court suggested that: 
(i) A reasonable banker must not only satisfy himself of the 
identity of a new client but also gather sufficient information 
regarding such a client to enable him to establish whether the 
person is who he purports to be.250 
(ii) The teller must identify a non-transferable cheque as such 
and treat it accordingly. Having regard to the volume of 
cheques, cash and various transactions with which the teller 
has to deal, it may be worth considering the introduction of a 
special non-transferable cheque that would be distinguishable 
from all other cheques.251 This option was in fact considered at 
a meeting of collecting bankers and was acceptable to all 
banks save one. Because these cheques would be easily 
identifiable, they could be removed from the ordinary system 
and put on a separate two-or-three day clearance system.252 
248 394-395. 
249 This conclusion vindicates the submission made by Malan and Pretorius 
(Negligence and the Collecting Bank: Liability at Last? (1993) 5 SA 
Mere LJ 206 212) that "it is unlikely that a collecting bank would be able 
to rebut the prima facie legal duty to prevent loss by negligently dealing 
with the cheque." 
250 395J-396A. 
251 396D. 
252 396E-F, 397A. 
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As to the last question before the court, namely, what can 
reasonably be expected of a bank, in the exercise of 
reasonable care, once a non-transferable cheque has been 
identified and passed through to the designated officer, 
Combrinck J held that there is an obvious duty on the 
designated officer to check whether the name of the payee 
accords with that of the depositor on the deposit slip. At a 
fairly minimal cost the computer can be programmed in order 
to give access to the full name of the account holder.253 
Although one cannot quarrel with the court's treatment of the 
steps which can be expected of a collecting bank, like lntlac 
Electronics, 254 this was also a case where the cheques were 
deposited at a branch of the drawee bank itself. Accordingly, 
the remarks made above, 255 with respect to the Indac 
Electronics case, also apply to the KwaMashu Bakery case.256 
Malan and Pretorius257 submit that after the KwaMashu 
Bakery case the unlawfulness issue must be regarded as being 
settled. 258 
Another case on the liability of a collecting bank, is that of 
Coetzee v ABSA Bank Bpk.259 The appellant (Mr Coetzee) 
and his ex-wife (Mrs Coetzee) operated separate, current bank 
accounts at the Arcadia branch of the respondent bank. The 
Arcadia branch was in possession of specimen signatures of 
the appellant and Mrs Coetzee. The Arcadia branch was aware 
that the appellant and Mrs Coetzee were divorced. The 
253 397C-E. 
254 Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 (I) SA 783 (A). 
255 fn 212. 
256 KwaMashu Bakery Limited v The Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 
1995 (I) SA 377 (D). The KwaMashu Bakery case is discussed by Malan 
and Pretorius (Liability of the Collecting Bank: More Clarity? ( 1994) 6 
SA Mere LJ218). 
257 para 246. 
258 See also Sher The Liability of a Collecting Bank towards the True 
Owner of a Cheque (1995) 3 Juta's Business Law 97 at 100. 
25
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appellant was the payee of a cheque for Rl8 000 drawn by 
Diners Club on Standard Bank, with the instruction 'pay to the 
order of Mr Coetzee'. It was therefore an order cheque.260 The 
cheque was crossed and marked 'not negotiable, ale payee 
only'. As such, the cheque was transferable.261 The cheque 
was presented by an unknown person at the Arcadia branch of 
the respondent as collecting bank for collection for the credit 
of Mrs Coetzee's account. On the reverse side the cheque had 
a signature purporting to be the indorsement of the appellant, 
but which in fact was not the appellant's. The cheque was 
collected by the Arcadia branch and credited Mrs Coetzee's 
account with the amount of the cheque. It was common cause 
that Mrs Coetzee had an account with Diners Club and that 
she had the right to use the account. Mrs Coetzee had a Diners 
Club card. The card was in the name of the appellant who was 
responsible for the account. The appellant had instituted in a 
magistrate's court an action for damages against the 
respondent as collecting bank. The action was dismissed by 
the court in terms of s 58 . Mrs Coetzee's estate was 
subsequently declared insolvent. The respondent alledged, 
inter alia, (a) that it had not acted negligently, and (b) that the 
appellant was not the true owner of the cheque. 
On appeal, the finding of the magistrate's court that s 58 
applied in casu was rejected. Section 58 protects the drawee 
bank in the case of forged or unauthorised indorsements, and 
not the collecting bank. The respondent, being the collecting 
bank, could therefore not rely on the provisions of s 58 .262 
The court stated263 that the case before it was based on the 
260s 6 (3). 
26
'Standard Bank of SA Ltd. v Sham Magazine Centre 1977 (1) SA 484 
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principles explained m lndac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v 
Volkskas Bank Ltd. 264 
As to the respondent's first allegation, the court held that there 
was no evidence that the teller at the Arcadia branch of the 
respondent, or any other official in that branch, took any steps 
to determine whether the signature on the reverse side of the 
cheque was indeed the appellant's, or at all to check the 
indorsement of the cheque. 265 The court referred to the 
principle that it is prima facie negligence to collect the 
amount of a cheque on behalf of a person not entitled to it. 
Here the court referred with approval to Holscher v ABSA 
Bank en 'n ander 266 and Volkskas Bank Bpk v Bonitas 
Medical Aid Fund. 267 
It was held further that although the crossing of the cheque did 
not affect its transferability and the cheque was clearly 
transferable, the crossing did have the effect of an instruction 
by the drawer to the collecting bank to collect the amount of 
the cheque for the account of the payee, the appellant. The 
crossing served as a warning to the collecting bank to exercise 
caution in respect of payment to the correct person, the 
holder.268 This warning included the need, if the payee was no 
longer the holder ex facie the cheque, to take reasonable steps 
to determine whether the alleged holder was indeed the true 
holder of the cheque.269 The court held that the respondent 
failed to verify the indorsement and no reasons were given as 
2641992 (1) SA 783 (A) at 801 where the Appellate Division recognised a 
legal duty on the part of the collecting bank to the true owner of a lost or 
stolen cheque to avoid causing him pure economic loss by negligently 
dealing with such a cheque. 
265891 -90. 
2661994 (2) SA 667 (T) 672E. 
2671993 (3) SA 779 (A) 791H-I. 
26890D-E. 
26990D-E. 
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to why the indorsement had not been checked against the 
specimen signature. Accordingly, the respondent was 
negligent. 270 
As to the respondent's second allegation, the court held that it 
had to be inferred from the facts that Mrs Coetzee either 
collected the cheque or received it through the post. Mrs 
Coetzee was the authorised agent in respect of the Diners 
Club account and, in receiving the cheque she received it as 
the agent of the appellant, even though she had the intention 
of appropriating the cheque for herself. The appellant was 
therefore the true owner of the cheque. 271 
7 .4 When a plaintiff wishes to claim damages due to negligent 
collection for an unlawful possessor, he has to prove that he 
was the true owner of the cheque concerned.272 In First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Quality Tyres (1970) (Pty) Ltd,273 
the basic question on appeal was whether the respondent 
(Quality Tyres) was in fact the true owner of the cheque 
concerned. It appears that an employee of the respondent, 
fraudulently persuaded the drawer to deposit the cheque in a 
trust account, which was kept with the appellant. As a result 
of the fraud, the drawer was under the impression that the 
account was the respondent's account. Since the drawer of a 
cheque is obviously the initial true owner thereof until he 
delivers it to someone else, the question was whether the 
drawer had ever delivered the cheque to the respondent. The 
answer to this was no. The employee concerned clearly never 
had the intention to acquire ownership of the cheque on behalf 
210 90F. 
271 90H. See Schulze Last Month's Law Reports 1997 De Rebus 741. 
272 See Fedgen Insurance Ltd v Bankorp Ltd 1994 (2) SA 399 (W); 
Holscher v ABSA Bank 1994 (2) SA 667 (T); Coetzee v ABSA Bank 
Bpk 1997 (4) SA 85 (T); Volkskas Bank Bpk v Bonitas Medical Aid 
Fund 1993 (3) SA 779 (A). 
273 1995 (3) SA 556 (A). The judgement of the court a quo is discussed by 
Sher (The Liability of the negligent Collecting Bank confirmed 
(1993) Juta's Business Law 85). 
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of the respondent. Moreover, there never was any delivery of 
the cheque by the drawer to the respondent or to somebody 
who received the cheque on behalf of the respondent. The 
drawer simply deposited the cheque directly in an account at 
another bank. Accordingly, the respondent did not prove its 
cause of action. The drawer remained the true owner of the 
cheque at all material times.274 The situation was different in 
APA Network Consultants (Pty) Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd.275 In 
this case the payee of the cheque indorsed it to the plaintiff 
and delivered it to the plaintiffs authorised employee. 
Thereafter the employee misapplied the cheque. According to 
the court, the reasonable inference was that the employee did 
indeed have the intention to acquire ownership of the cheque 
on behalf of the plaintiff. An intention to steal the cheque 
thereafter could therefore not prevent transfer of ownership to 
the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff had indeed become the 
true owner of the cheque.276 
7 .5 We referred, inter alia, to the Zimbabwean case of Bank 
of Credit and Commerce Zimbabwe Ltd v UDC Ltd,277 where 
the court made a finding of contributory negligence on the 
part of the plaintiff (true owner), and consequently awarded a 
reduced amount of damages. That follows from the principle 
of apportionment of delictual damages in the case of 
contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff, which in South 
Africa is regulated by the Apportionment of Damages Act.278 
274 568. 
275 1996 (1) SA 1159 (W). 
276 1167. 
277 1991 (4) SA 82 (ZSC). In this case the court held that the drawer's 
negligence was significantly greater than that of the collecting bank : the 
drawer was persuaded to finance a transaction involving the sale of a 
tractor by a farming company called "Mixed Tums (Pvt) Ltd" to a farmer 
called "Gibson Nehati". Gibson Nehati did not exist, nor did Mixed Tums 
(Pvt) Ltd or the tractor. The court apportioned the loss so as to place 80 
per cent of the responsibility on the drawer and 20 per cent on the 
collecting bank (93D). See also Pretorius 1991 Annual Survey 265. 
21
• Act 34of1956. 
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In an interesting South African case that of Greater 
Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council v ABSA 
Bank Ltd tla Volkskas Bank,279 the court found that the 
relevant employee of the collecting bank, as well as the 
relevant employee of the plaintiff (true owner), had acted 
intentionally. It was further held that, notwithstanding their 
dolus, both had nevertheless still acted within the course and 
scope of their service, with the result that their fault was 
respectively ascribed to the collecting bank and to the 
plaintiff. In terms of the Apportionment of Damages Act, the 
amount of damages awarded was consequently reduced by 
half. However, the correctness of the finding that the intention 
of the plaintiffs employee could be ascribed to the plaintiff, is 
doubtful. Even if it was part of the employee's duties to take 
delivery of the cheque and to deposit it, it seems inequitable to 
ascribe his intention to misapply the cheque to the plaintiff, 
where the collecting bank (through its employee) knew about 
that intention. This follows from the general principles of 
vicarious liability. According to Malan and Pretorius280 the 
court was correct in ascribing the intention of the plaintiffs 
employee to the plaintiff. The real significance of the Greater 
Johannesburg judgement, however, lies in its confirmation 
of the fact that the Apportionment of Damages Act applies not 
only when there is negligence on both sides, but also when 
there is intention on both sides. If there was intention on the 
one side and only negligence on the other side, the Act does 
not apply, and the plaintiff may either recover his full 
damages or no damages at all, depending on which party acted 
intentionally. 
The element of causation may also play a role in determining 
the liability of a collecting bank. In Greenfields Engineering 
Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd181 the court 
21
• 1996 (4) All SA 278 (W). 
280 Medewerkende Opset en die Invorderingsbank ( 1997) 60 THRHR 
153 155. See Minister van Wet en Orde v Ntsane 1993 (1) SA 560 (A). 
2
•
1 1978 (4) SA 901(N)912G-H. 
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concluded that the drawer of the cheque had acted negligently 
in drawing the cheque "in an improper and unbusinesslike 
manner", and that the issue of causality did not provide any 
particular problems in this case. In Barclays Bank DCO v 
Straw,282 the negligence of the drawer was held not to be the 
causa causans of the loss sustained where the amount payable 
on a cheque had been altered without the drawer's consent. 
7 .6 It is now clear that the collecting bank owes a duty of care 
to the true owner of a lost or stolen cheque.283By way of 
analogy, a similar duty of care to that of the collecting bank 
rests on the drawee bank to prevent loss through negligence in 
paying and thus discharging the cheque or the rights under 
it.284 
282 1965 (2) SA 93 (0). 
283 Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 (1) SA 783 (A); 
Volkskas Bank Bpk v Bonitas Medical Aid Fund 1993 (3) SA 779 (A); 
Fedgen Insurance Ltd v Bankorp Ltd 1994 (2) SA 399 (W); KwaMashu 
Bakery Limited v The Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1995 (1) SA 
377 (D). 
284 Rhostar (Pvt) Ltd v Netherlands Bank of Rhodesia Ltd 1972 (2) SA 703 
(R) 715-716. It was said there : "There is no contractual relationship 
between a collecting banker and the drawer of the cheque. The collecting 
banker acts on behalf of his customer to collect the proceeds of the cheque 
from the paying banker. But even as an agent the banker assumes and 
accepts obligations relating to third parties, and is aware that his failure to 
act in a reasonable manner can result in loss to the drawer of the cheque 
accepted for collection ... The collecting banker is the only one who is in a 
position to know whether or not the cheque is being collected on behalf of 
the person who is entitled to receive payment. The evidence clearly 
established . .. that a paying banker has no knowledge whether or not a 
cheque is being collected on behalf of a person entitled to it and has to 
rely, and does rely, on the collecting banker to present a cheque for 
collection on behalf of the person to whom it is lawfully payable. The 
evidence revealed that all bankers are fully aware of this position and 
collecting bankers consider it their duty to ensure that they only present a 
cheque for collection on behalf of a client who is entitled to receive 
payment under it. In such a situation and these circumstances a duty of 
Continued on next page ... 
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Oelofse285 is of the opinion that, because the drawee bank has 
a contractual duty only to its customer in terms of the 
bank-customer relationship, and not the holder, the drawee 
bank cannot incur delictual liability to the true owner. 
However, a duty of care is the outcome of a judicial 
judgement embracing all relevant facts, including matters of 
policy.286 The policy considerations justifying the imposition 
of a duty of care are the high risk affecting the cheque in that 
payment can be obtained by an unlawful possessor with 
care arises and is owned by the collecting banker to the drawer of the 
cheque to take due and reasonable care to prevent him from sustaining 
loss. The drawer has the right to expect that the collecting banker will not 
cause him loss by carelessly collecting from his bank on behalf of a 
person who is not entitled to receive payment. The collecting banker does 
not acquire the cheque but undertakes in the course of his business to 
receive other persons' cheques payable to its clients for collection on their 
behalf. In other words, a collecting bank holds itself out as carrying on the 
business of collecting from paying banks amounts payable in terms of the 
drawer's cheque. Accordingly, while there is no contractual relationship 
between them, the collecting banker owes a duty of care to the drawer to 
take reasonable precautions that no harm comes to him in such 
circumstances. 
The risk of fraud is ever present in the acceptance of cheques for payment 
or for collection and the risk that the person presenting the cheque for 
payment or collection is not entitled to obtain payment under it is equally 
likely to occur; even when the person presenting the cheque for payment 
may do so innocently. If no duty of care is owed, it would follow that a 
banker need not examine or even look at the cheque to ascertain to whom 
it is payable. Such conduct would ensure that he had no knowledge that 
his customer had no right to the cheque and consequently he would not be 
liable for any loss incurred by the drawer ... There is no reason at all why 
any banker should be in a special position and not be subject to a normal 
duty of care or why he should be encouraged in not taking care and derive 
protection from failing to do so. The likelihood of harm to a drawer from 
failure to observe due care should be realised by any reasonably prudent 
banker ... therefore... a collecting banker should only undertake to, or 
present, a cheque for collection after he has reasonably assured himself 
that his client is entitled to payment." 
285 1982 4 Modern Business Law 50 52. 
286 Administrateur Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A) 
833-834). See Malan 1979 De Jure 31 32-34; Van der Walt Nalatige 
Wanvoorstelling en Suiwer Vermoenskade : die Appelhof Spreek 'n 
Duidelike Woord 1979 TSAR 145. 
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relative ease; the fact that banks are able to control this risk by 
exercising reasonable care in the collection and payment of 
cheques; and that they render professional services calling for 
professional responsibilities. 287 
According to Malan and De Beer288 the drawee bank would 
not be held liable to the true owner where in the ordinary 
course of business it pays a lost or stolen cheque to another 
bank collecting payment for the wrong person, because only 
the collecting bank is able to verify the title of its 
depositor.289The authors further say thats 83(1) protects the 
drawee bank against a delictual claim by the owner where it 
pays a cheque that has not been indorsed or that has been 
irregularly indorsed, and that s 58 provides protection for the 
drawee bank not only within its relationship with the drawer 
but also against a possible delictual claim by the owner of a 
lost or stolen cheque.290 It may be added here that the drawee 
bank enjoys extensive protection under ss 58, 79 and 83.291 
287 See Malan and De Beer para 354 fn 67. 
288 para 354. 
289 See Rhostar (Pvt) Ltd v Nederlands Bank of Rhodesia Ltd 1972 (2) 
703(R) 715; Zimbabwe Banking Corp Ltd v Pyramid Motor Corp (Pvt) 
Ltd 1985 (4) SA 553 (ZSC) 565. 
290 See also Malan and Pretorius para 252 and 209. 
291 See the discussion above and Malan and De Beer (paras 324, 334 and 
341-343) with regard to the protection provided to the drawee bank by 
ss 58, 79 and 83. Note further that s 58 applies to both crossed and 
uncrossed cheques. This overlapping with s 79 may be relevant where the 
drawee bank pays in accordance with the crossing, but does so negligently 
(s 58 merely requires a payment "in good faith and in the ordinary course 
of business"). Malan and De Beer (para 334) acknowledge that s 58 
applies to both crossed and uncrossed cheques, but they also say that a 
bank which pays a crossed cheque must necessarily comply with the 
requirements of s 79 in order to be protected against a forged 
indorsement. This cannot be correct. Either s 58 applies or it does not, in 
which case payment must be made without negligence (see Cowen (1966) 
4ed 425-426). A further difference between s 58 and s 79 appears from 
the proviso in s 58. According to the proviso s 58 does not afford 
protection to the drawee bank ifthe forged indorsement purports to be that 
of a customer of the particular branch on which the cheque is drawn. 
Section 79 does not contain this limitation. 
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8 Conclusion 
Regarding the question whether ss 58, 79 and 83 apply to 
non-transferrable cheques, the conclusion is that s 58 is 
clearly not applicable to such cheques. In our view, s 79 does 
not apply either for the reasons explained. However the 
Appellate Division in Eskom v First National Bank of 
Southern Africa Ltd292 decided that s 79 is applicable to 
non-transferable cheques. It is now clear that s 79 does apply 
to such cheques. 
The question whether s 83 also applies to non-transferable 
cheques was left open in Gishen v Nedbank Ltd.293 Malan and 
Pretorius294 are apparently of the view that s 83 may in fact be 
applicable. In our view s 83 (like s 58) clearly only applies to 
cheques which can be validly indorsed. Non-transferable 
cheques are therefore excluded.295 Furthermore, the history of 
s 83 leads to the conclusion that the enactment of the section 
had nothing to do with non-transferable cheques. It has been 
explained296 that before the Bills of Exchange Act came into 
operation in May 1964, it was standard practice for banks to 
require an account holder who deposited a cheque for 
collection to sign the back of the cheque. Drawee banks 
required the "indorsement"297 so that they could pay directly 
to the holder when paying to the collecting bank, and not 
merely to the collecting agent of the holder. Section 83 made 
it unnecessary to retain this requirement, while in the case of 
non-transferable cheques the "indorsement" could in any case 
not constitute the collecting bank holder of the cheque.298 The 
292 1995 (2) SA 386 (A). 
293 1984 (2) SA 378 (W). 
294 1992 TSAR 77 90. 
295 See also Tager 19 LAWSA para 166; Pretorius 1984 SALJ 250 253; 
Sinclair and Visser 1984Annual Survey 391. 
296 See above 29. 
297 See National Bank v Paterson 1909 TS 322 326-327. Also Gering 
Handbook 290; Cowen (1966) 4ed 442-444. 
298 See Malan and De Beer para 349. 
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advantage of the indorsement was that collecting banks could 
claim as holders in their own name if the cheque was 
dishonoured. Accordingly, they were also not prepared to 
abandon the practice, unless they could retain the rights that 
they would otherwise have had. Section 84 provided for this. 
Normally, the collecting bank has no need to become the 
holder. If the cheque is dishonoured, it merely returns the 
cheque to its client and debits the account; the latter must then 
take the necessary steps to obtain payment himself.299 Section 
84 was probably not necessary. Also, because it is an 
instrument of payment, a cheque is seldom negotiated but is 
usually deposited by the payee on his account with his bank as 
an agent for collection.300And for this reason it is not 
necessary to indorse cheques deposited for collection. 
However, the legislatures both here and in England, were 
ready to oblige.301 
Sections 83 and 84 are retained in Malan, Oelofse and 
Pretorius's proposed Cheques Act, 302 as clause 60303 with 
some minor changes : the phrase "in the ordinary course of 
business" is omitted and the reference to the discharge of the 
instrument in s 83 is left out. 
299 Bloems Timber Kilns (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bpk 1976 (4) SA 677 (A) 
686. 
300 See Malan and De Beer para 341fn96. 
301 In England the Mocatta Committee was appointed, and as result of its 
report (Report of the Committee on Cheque Endorsement Cmnd 13 
1956), the Cheques Act of 1957 was enacted. In South Africa a Select 
Committee was appointed (Report of the Select Committee on the 
Subject of the Bills of Exchange Amendment Bill, SC 10 of 1963), and 
its recommendations led to the enactment of ss 83, 84, 85 and 86 of the 
Act. See Malan and De Beer para 341 fn 100. 
'
02 Proposals for the Reform of the Bills of Exchange Act 1964 (1988) 
637. 
303 Clause 60 reads : "Rights of collecting bank - where a cheque which is 
payable to order, or a non-transferable cheque is delivered by the holder 
thereof to a collecting bank for collection, and such cheque is not indorsed 
or was irregularly indorsed by such holder, such bank shall have such 
rights, if any, as it would have had if, upon delivery, the holder had 
indorsed it in blank." 
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Clause 40 of the Amendment Bill304 proposes a new 
subsection to s 84 which provides that if a non-transferable 
cheque is delivered to a banker for collection, such banker, 
shall have the rights of the payee of such cheque (emphasis 
added). This, with respect, cannot be accepted. A 
non-transferable cheque contains a clear intention that no-one 
other than the named payee shall have any rights in the 
cheque.305 
Regarding the question whether the non-transferability of a 
cheque implies only that a cambial transfer is excluded, but 
transfer of the rights arising from a non-transferable cheque 
by means of an ordinary cession is still possible, the answer is 
not yet clear. Malan and Pretorius306 submit that only the 
cambial method of transfer is excluded, so that cession of the 
rights flowing from the cheque is still possible. According to 
Oelofse307 such an express indication of non-transferability 
also affects the possibility of cession. It appears that Oelofse's 
view is correct. It seems illogical to distinguish between 
transferability in the cambial sense and transferability by 
ordinary cession when a cheque contains words clearly aimed 
at ensuring that only the named payee receives payment. If 
cession was still possible, the drawer's intention would 
definitely be frustrated.308 Oelofse's view does not, of course, 
mean that the exclusion of a cambial transfer necessarily also 
excludes cession. The effect of restricting words is determined 
by the interpretation of the words. The matter here needs to be 
clarified by the courts.309 
304 General Notice 1427 Government Gazette 19075 of21July1998. 
305 See Mofokeng and Pretorius (1999) 11 SA Mere LJ 152 158. 
306 para 234. 
307 1987 Modern Business Law 129 135. 
30
" See De Villiers and others NNO v Electronic Media Network (Pty) Ltd 
1991 (2) SA 180 (W) 183. 
309 Whether an ordinary cession of the rights arising from a non-transferable 
Continued on next page ... 
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Regarding the question whether a bank paying to or collecting 
a non-transferable cheque (or any cheque) for someone other 
than the owner incurs delictual liability to the owner for any 
loss he may have suffered, the matter was eventually settled 
by the Appellate Division in Indac Electronics3 10 as far as the 
liability of the collecting bank is concerned. The Appellate 
Division decided on exception that a collecting bank is indeed 
liable for damages to the true owner if such bank negligently 
collects the amount of a cheque for the wrong person. The 
traditional approach of the South African courts was thus 
rejected and the Zimbabwean approach was followed. A 
collecting bank will be negligent if it does not take reasonable 
steps to ascertain whether its client is ex facie the cheque 
entitled to payment. By way of analogy, the same applies to a 
drawee bank acting negligently. 311 
Clearly, the law regarding the non-transferable cheque needs 
reform. It is simply because of a "historical accident", as Lord 
Chorley put it,312 that a cheque is a "negotiable instrument" 
and has been made subject to the same rules which apply to 
cheque is possible is not a matter that needs legislating. See Oelofse 
Rektawissel en Rektatjek, Verhandeling en Sessie in die Duitse en 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 1987 Modern Business Law 129; Malan, Oelofse 
and Pretorius Proposals for the Reform of the Bills of Exchange Act 
1964 (1988) 575. 
310 Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Ltd 1992 (1) SA 783 (A). 
311 See Malan and Pretorius para 252. 
312 Chorley The Cheque as Mandate and Negotiable Instrument (1939) 
60 Journal of the Institute of Bankers 392. See also Holden The History 
of Negotiable Instruments in English Law (1955) 315-316; Holden 
Suggested Reform of the Law Relating to Cheques ( 1951) 14 Modern 
Law Review 33 44-45. Murray (1968) 20 Hastings Law Journal 273 
states, at 275: "The negotiability concept originated with the law 
merchant as a means of making the bill and the note efficient commercial 
substitutes for money... negotiability facilitates the transfer of such 
instruments, which are issued primarily for credit." 
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ordinary bills of exchange. While transferability and 
negotiability have always been essential features of bills of 
exchange,313 which are used not only as a means of payment 
but also as a source of credit (and must be capable of 
circulating freely in the discount markets prior to maturity), 
cheques, by contrast, are generally used simply as a means of 
payment (to pay for goods or services) and not for credit, and 
the instrument's transferability is, in the vast majority of 
cases, an unwanted feature exposing both the drawer and the 
payee to the risk of fraud by third parties. 
In its report of February 1989 the Jack Committee proposed 
two possible solutions to this problem.314 The first was to 
introduce a new non-transferable payment instrument, the 
"bank payment order", and the second was to introduce by 
statute, a clear method for making cheques non-
transferable. 315 The Committee recommended the first 
alternative. However, objections by the banks to the 
introduction of a new payment instrument prevailed and the 
second alternative was adopted.316 
Malan, Oelofse and Pretorius317 in chapter 6 (clause 52) of the 
proposed Cheques Act, make specific provision that a 
non-transferable cheque is a crossed cheque which is payable 
313 Although cheques are of course, bills of exchange, the expression is used 
here to mean bills of exchange which are not payable on demand. 
314 Banking Services : Law and Practice Report by the Review Committee 
Cm 622 55-56. 
315 The salient features of the "bank payment order" have as follows : unlike 
a cheque - the proceeds could be paid only to the person specified as 
payee in the bank payment order (so that it could not be transferred or 
negotiated). But like a crossed cheque - it would be addressed by the 
account holder or his agent, to the banker who holds his account, 
requiring the banker to pay on demand, a specified sum, only through the 
agency of a collecting bank (or by internal transfer if the accounts of the 
drawer and payee were held at the same bank). See appendix M the pro 
forma of a "bank payment order" and its legal characteristics. 
316 s 81A BEA. 
317 Proposals for the Reform of the Bills of Exchange Act 1964 (1988) 
555ff. 
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to a specified person and which complies with the requirement 
of form set out in the First Schedule, and that it is only 
capable of negotiation to a collecting banker. Provision is thus 
made that the words "not transferable" form part of the 
crossing.318 A non-transferable cheque can be indorsed by the 
payee to a collecting bank only, but because ss 83 and 84 have 
been retained (clause 60), such an indorsement is not 
necessary.319 The banks' practices announced in the 
newspapers320 concerning "not transferable" cheques and 
those marked "only" thus appear to conform closely to the 
envisaged provisions of the proposed Cheques Act in this 
regard. 
Holden321 had already in 1951 suggested the introduction of a 
non-transferable cheque. He said "that the needs of the 
business community for a method of making remittances 
without risk ought to be provided by the introduction of a 
non-transferable mandate." He concluded that "if a short Act 
was passed to facilitate the introduction of a non-transferable 
order . . . there is little doubt that the mercantile community 
would benefit : businessmen would be provided with a 
method of making remittances free from risks of loss and 
theft, and collecting bankers would be freed from most of the 
risks inherent in the collection of open and crossed cheques 
today". 
318 In Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Sham Magazine Centre 1977 (l) SA 484 
(A) 505, Holmes JA explicitly indicated that the words 'non-transferable' 
do not constitute part of the crossing. 
319 Clause 52 reads : 
Non-Transferable Cheque 
(1) A non -transferable cheque is a crossed cheque which is payable to 
a specified person which complies with the requirements of the form 
set out in the First Schedule. 
(2) A non -transferable cheque may be negotiated by the payee to a 
collecting bank only (an explanation of clause 52 is given in pages 
575-577 of the Proposals). 
320 See eg the Citizen of5 August 1991. 
321 Suggested Reform of the Law Relating to Cheques (1951) 14 Modern 
Law Review 33 45 52. 
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Murray322 suggests "an instrument which calls upon a bank to 
pay the payee, but which can be neither negotiated to a holder 
in due course nor assigned to anyone for the purpose of 
collection except a bank in which the payee has an existing 
account." 
On 13 November 1982 the South African Law Commission 
invited submissions on the necessity of revision of the Bills of 
Exchange Act 34 of 1964. Oelofse, Stassen and Du Plessis323 
made the recommendation that the principle of negotiability of 
cheques should be abolished. All cheques should be 
non-transferable and that only the payee should be entitled to 
payment thereon, in order to give effect to the intention of the 
majority of users of the cheque as a payment mechanism and 
also to eliminate abuse of the cheque system.324 In view of the 
present day use of cheques as a means of payment and the 
risks involved in such use, we tend to agree with this 
recommendation. 
Although a cheque can be made non-transferable325 by the 
addition of the applicable words, the matter is complicated 
and very few persons who have a bank account have clear and 
accurate knowledge of how to do it. And even if they know 
what to do, they may encounter opposition from the banks. No 
less fundamental and disturbing is the fact that far too few are 
aware of the real source of danger which is, of course, that a 
cheque is a "negotiable instrument" and as such subject to the 
322 Crossed Checks, Account Payee and Non-Negotiable Checks (1968) 20 
Hastings Law Journal 273 276-277. 
323 Hersiening van die Wisselwet (1983) 5 Modern Business Law 67. The 
authors also made recommendations regarding amendments to the existing 
provisions relating to cheques which would have to be considered if the 
negotiability of cheques is retained, and recommendations relating to bills 
of exchange in general pertaining to provisions of the Act which are not 
exclusively applicable to cheques. 
324 See also the Report of the Mocatta Committee (Cmnd 3of1956 para 34) 
which opted for simplicity rather than allow two different forms of 
cheques - both transferable and non-transferable - to be used. 
325 s 6(5). 
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same rules governing ordinary bills of exchange. Hence, the 
need for legislative intervention to remove the negotiability of 
cheques. Until that happens, that is, the negotiability of 
cheques is abolished, the use of a cheque for the payment of 
debts will remain fraught with danger for several innocent 
parties in the all too frequent case of the cheque falling into 
the hands of dishonest persons.326However, the proposed 
amendment327 is bound to create uncertainty, confusion and 
conflict with the rest of the Act. Moreover, the proposed 
amendment is biased in favour of the banks.328 
326 See Cowen Two Cheers (or maybe only one) for Negotiability - The 
Sham Magazine case: Its Implications and Repercussions (1977) 40 
THRHR 19 35ff. 
327 The Amendment Bill - General Notice 1427 Government Gazette 19075 
of21 July 1998. 
m Mofokeng and Pretorius (1999) 11 SA Mere LJ at 165. 
The paper is written under the guidance of Professor JT Pretorius. 
I am indebted to Prof Pretorius for his valuable comments and suggestions. 
Naturally, any views advanced are my own. 
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